The Impact of Government Funding on Domestic Violence Shelters and Domestic Violence Incidents

Morgan Kearns*

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Abstract

Domestic violence (DV) shelters receive millions of dollars in government grants each year, yet little evidence documents how this funding affects shelter operations or community-level violence. I build a novel panel of the DV shelters in Georgia (2013–2023) by scraping IRS Form 990 filings and link it to county-level hospital discharges, homicides, and child-maltreatment reports. I use this dataset to provide the first systematic description of a state's DV shelter sector, documenting shelter finances, staffing, and the services shelters offer. Using two-way fixed effects models that exploit within-shelter variation in contemporaneous and lagged grant funding, I estimate the effect of a $100,000 increase in government grants sustained over the current and prior year. Such an increase raises annual shelter revenue by $86,700, with little evidence of crowd-out of private donations. Total expenditures rise by $73,300, including a $39,300 increase in compensation, while employee counts rise by 1.07. Thus, government grants translate into additional shelter resources and staffing. Despite these organizational responses, I find little evidence of corresponding changes in DV-related hospitalizations, homicides, or child maltreatment.

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1 Introduction

Domestic violence (DV) is a prevalent public health concern. Almost half of women and four in ten men in the United States report experiencing DV in their lifetime (Leemis et al., 2022). DV shelters provide safe housing and services such as case management and counseling to victims, often during periods of crisis or while leaving abusive situations, and they rely heavily on government funding to operate. Much of that funding comes through the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA), whose national distributions fell from $4.4 billion in 2018 to $1.9 billion in 2023 (Office for Victims of Crime, 2026). Little is known about how shelters use these funds or how government funding affects shelter operations and DV-related outcomes.

This gap reflects a data constraint as no publicly available, longitudinal database of DV shelters exists or catalogs their funding and expenditures. I overcome this constraint by scraping IRS Form 990 filings to construct a novel panel of the DV shelters in Georgia from 2013 to 2023, with detailed information on shelter finances, operations, and grant funding. Linking this panel to Georgia's victim-services administrative records, I provide the first systematic description of a state's DV shelter sector, documenting the sector's financial resources, staffing, geographic coverage, and service provision. I then examine how changes in government funding affect shelter finances and operations. Finally, I link shelter funding to county-level hospital discharges, homicides, and child maltreatment reports to examine whether changes in funding affect these downstream outcomes.

The effects of additional government funding on DV outcomes are theoretically ambiguous. First, the extent to which additional government funding translates into greater shelter resources depends on whether it crowds out other sources of shelter revenue, such as private donations. Conditional on expanding shelter resources, the effect of additional government funding on county-level hospital discharges, homicides, and child maltreatment reports depends on how shelters allocate those resources. Shelters could use additional funding to expand capacity on the extensive margin, hiring more case managers or adding beds, which could reduce violence by allowing more victims to safely exit abusive situations. Al-

ternatively, shelters could use additional funding on the intensive margin, improving the quality or intensity of services available to victims. These improvements could also reduce violence—for example, by reducing repeat victimization among those a shelter already serves. But if the resulting benefits are concentrated among a shelter's existing clients, they may be difficult to detect in county-level measures. Additional funding could enable more victims to seek safety from an abusive situation, although the period surrounding separation involves a heightened risk of violence. Moreover, increased shelter engagement with victims may increase help-seeking or reporting, potentially increasing observed measures of violence even if underlying violence declines. Whether government funding expands shelter resources, and whether it reduces these measured outcomes, are therefore empirical questions.

I begin by providing the first systematic description of a state's DV shelter sector over time. Georgia's DV shelters locate in more populous counties—35 percent of metropolitan counties host a shelter, compared with 16 percent of rural counties. Average violence rates, however, are not statistically different between counties with and without a shelter. All Georgia shelters offered fourteen common services at some point during 2018–2022, including crisis intervention, transportation assistance, and legal assistance, yet the share of shelters offering a given service in every year observed ranges from 61 to 96 percent. Average government grants received grew by 52 percent in real terms, from approximately $557,000 per shelter in 2013 to $843,000 in 2023, though this growth was not uniform across shelters. This variation in grant funding, both within and across shelters, is central to the empirical strategy that follows.

To estimate the effects of government funding, I exploit within-shelter variation in grant funding over time in a two-way fixed effects framework that includes current and lagged grant funding. I estimate the effect of a $100,000 increase in government grants sustained over the current and prior year. Such an increase raises annual shelter revenue by $86,700. Private donations do not decline significantly over this same period, and the estimates rule out declines larger than about 31 cents per grant dollar. These results indicate

that government grants expand the resources available to shelters rather than substituting for other funding sources, in contrast to the crowd-out documented in the broader non-profit literature. Shelters spend the majority of this additional revenue. Total annual expenditures rise by $73,300, with much of the increase concentrated in compensation. Employee counts rise by 1.07 per shelter. Government funding therefore produces a substantial organizational response, increasing shelter revenue, expenditure, and staffing. I find little evidence, however, that these additional shelter resources reduce county-level hospital discharges, homicides, or child maltreatment reports, although the estimates are generally small and imprecise. Effects may be concentrated among victims already connected to shelter services and therefore difficult to detect in county-level measures, and any reductions in underlying violence may be offset by increased help-seeking and reporting.

My analyses contribute to three literatures. First, I contribute to the literature examining how government funding affects nonprofit organizations. A large literature studies whether public grants expand nonprofit resources or instead crowd out private giving, and generally finds substantial crowd-out, driven largely by reductions in fundraising effort (Andreoni & Payne, 2003, 2011; Froelich, 1999; Grosskopf et al., 2020; Pizzini & Sterin, 2025). The fundraising response varies with grant structure, as conditional grants increase fundraising expenditure, while lump-sum grants reduce it (Thornton, 2014). I find little evidence of crowd-out among DV shelters on average. That is, my results imply that private donations and fundraising expenditures do not significantly decline in response to sustained increases in government funding. I also show how additional public funding translates into organizational resources, increasing shelter expenditures and staffing. These results provide the first evidence on how government grants affect the finances and operations of DV shelters.

Second, I contribute to the literature on policies and interventions that affect DV by examining government funding for DV shelters. Existing work has largely focused on the effects of criminal justice interventions on DV, including arrest policies, prosecution, restraining orders, and police presence, with mixed results (Aizer & Dal Bó, 2009; Black

et al., 2023; Dugan et al., 2003; Raissian, 2016). These interventions primarily alter the abuser's incentives through deterrence or legal consequence. A growing body of work also examines non-criminal levers. Sims et al. (2024) find no significant effect of state EITC expansions on lethal intimate partner violence, Carr and Packham (2021) show that SNAP disbursement timing affects DV incidence, and Geddes and Holz (2026) find that rent control reduces hospitalizations for female assault. These interventions alter the economic or housing constraints that can shape victims' exposure to violence and their ability to leave abusive situations. In contrast, DV shelters directly support victims experiencing or leaving abusive situations by providing refuge, safety planning, advocacy, and other services. I provide the first evidence on whether funding for these shelter programs affects county-level hospital discharges, homicides, and child maltreatment reports.

Third, I contribute to the very limited work that has examined the causal effects of DV shelters themselves. Prior work has focused on shelter access and bed capacity and has largely examined impacts on homicides. Schechter (2023) finds that opening a shelter in a county where none previously existed reduces county-level female intimate-partner homicides by roughly one per 100,000 people every three to four years.[1] Sims (2021) finds no causal effect of changes in shelter bed capacity on intimate partner violence (IPV) or DV homicides.[2] However, DV shelter openings and closings are relatively rare. For example, no DV shelter opened or closed in Georgia during my sample period. I instead exploit variation in government funding to existing shelters, a policy margin that varies substantially even when shelter access does not. I also broaden the outcomes considered beyond homicide to include DV-related hospital discharges and child maltreatment reports while tracing how funding first affects shelter finances and operations.

Section 2 describes the DV shelter sector and its federal funding. Section 3 details the panel dataset. Section 4 characterizes the Georgia DV shelter landscape and the services

[1]The shelter measure in Schechter (2023) includes family, youth, DV, and homeless shelters, though she argues that most counties gaining their first shelter are gaining a DV shelter specifically.

[2]Sims (2021) is not publicly available; characterization is based on discussion with the author.

shelters provide. Section 5 presents the empirical strategy. Section 6 reports results, beginning with shelter finances and operations before turning to violence outcomes. Section 7 presents robustness checks, and Section 8 concludes.

2 Background

2.1 Domestic Violence Shelters

DV shelters provide immediate housing and support services for victims fleeing abusive relationships. Victims who seek these services often have few alternatives for safe housing, in part because abuse limits their financial resources. Many abusers engage in economic abuse, controlling a partner's access to money, employment, or other resources. Adams et al. (2008) find that 102 of 103 women receiving services from a DV organization had experienced economic abuse. In a survey of callers to the National Domestic Violence Hotline, 73 percent reported staying in an abusive relationship longer than they wanted because of financial concerns (Adams et al., 2020). These financial effects persist after the abuse ends. Adams et al. (2012) find that IPV is associated with lower job stability and economic well-being among low-income women for up to three years after the violence ends. Abusers further limit victims' alternatives by isolating them from family and friends (DomesticShelters.org, 2015). Without access to shelter, victims who leave an abusive partner may become homeless. Surveys of homeless women in Chicago, New York, and Minnesota suggest that between 22 and 57 percent identify DV as the immediate cause of their homelessness (Center for Impact Research, 2004; Institute for Children & Poverty, 2004; Wilder Research Center, 2004).

Unlike homeless shelters, DV shelters typically give each resident or family a private room for the duration of their stay.[3] The DV shelter sector is also much smaller. Georgia's DV shelters report approximately 1,000 beds,[4] compared to roughly 5,300 beds across the

[3]Based on program descriptions on Georgia DV shelter websites.

[4]Bed counts are 2024 point-in-time estimates, drawn from shelter websites where available and from the author's direct contact with the remaining shelters.

state's homeless shelters (Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2024). Demand for DV housing exceeds this capacity. On a single day in September 2024, Georgia DV programs housed 1,393 adults and children in emergency shelters, transitional housing, and hotels, while 275 requests for housing went unmet (National Network to End Domestic Violence, 2024).

Beyond housing, DV shelters provide a menu of services such as counseling, childcare, legal aid, and housing assistance (Craig, 2023). Shelters typically employ a program director and specialized advocates for legal assistance, housing, and children's services.[5] Because each advocate carries a caseload, staffing levels limit how many victims can receive each service.

2.2 Victims of Crime Act Funding

Government grants account for 68 percent of revenue for the average Georgia DV shelter over 2013–2023. The largest federal source of funding for victim services, including DV shelters, is the Crime Victims Fund (CVF), established by the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 and financed by fines and penalties from federal criminal cases (Sacco, 2020). Congress caps the amount that can be distributed from the CVF each year. From the cap's introduction in 2000 through 2014, it ranged from $500 million to $745 million. In 2015, Congress tripled the cap to $2.4 billion, and the grants states received for victim services more than quadrupled (Sacco, 2020). The cap peaked at $4.4 billion in 2018 and fell to $1.9 billion by 2023 as deposits into the fund declined (Office for Victims of Crime, 2026).

States receive these CVF-funded Victim Assistance Grants in proportion to their population share. Hereafter, I refer to these funds as VOCA grants. Georgia, with roughly 3 percent of the U.S. population, receives approximately 3 percent of the total distributed to states. Federal rules require states to direct at least 10 percent of their VOCA grants to domestic violence programs, at least 10 percent to sexual assault programs, and at least 10 percent to child abuse programs. States must direct another 10 percent to programs serving

[5]Based on staff pages from Georgia DV shelter websites and staffing constraint reports from the National Network to End Domestic Violence (National Network to End Domestic Violence, 2024).

previously underserved victims, which can include victims in any of these three categories. States allocate the remaining 60 percent at their discretion (Office for Victims of Crime, 2026).

Within Georgia, the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council (CJCC) allocates VOCA grants to individual shelters. In a November 2025 interview, a director at the Georgia Coalition Against Domestic Violence (GCADV), which assists shelters with the VOCA funding application process, reported that GCADV had helped CJCC develop a standardized allocation rubric. When I later contacted CJCC to request a copy of the rubric, staff confirmed that it had been developed but never implemented. Staff did not describe any alternative systematic allocation process. CJCC's funding decisions therefore do not appear to follow a publicly documented formula.

The 2015 increase in the national CVF cap raised the VOCA grants available to Georgia through 2018. Shelters experienced different changes in government grants over this period. The empirical analysis uses this within-shelter variation in grant funding.

2.3 Conceptual Framework

Government funding, whether from VOCA or other sources, can affect shelter resources and victim outcomes through several mechanisms. For this funding to benefit victims, it must first increase the resources available to DV shelters. A dollar of government funding need not increase shelter resources by exactly one dollar. For example, government grants may crowd out private donations if shelters reduce fundraising effort in response to government funding or if donors redirect their giving (Andreoni & Payne, 2003, 2011). Whether additional government funding expands the resources shelters use for staffing and service provision is therefore an empirical question. If additional funding does expand shelter resources, it could affect county-level violence through three channels.

First, additional funding may improve the intensity or quality of services provided to victims already in contact with shelters, such as additional counseling sessions, more

consistent case management, or expanded legal advocacy. These service changes could reduce repeat victimization among existing clients. Because existing clients are a small share of all victims in a county, however, the benefits could be meaningful for those clients without generating a detectable change in county-level violence.

Second, additional funding may expand shelter capacity to serve victims who would not otherwise receive help, for example by hiring additional caseworkers or adding beds. Serving more victims could reduce county-level violence by helping them leave abusive relationships or access protective resources. However, increased contact with shelters and other service providers, such as hospitals, may also increase reporting or documentation of violence. As a result, measured violence could increase even if underlying violence declines.

Third, additional funding may expand outreach efforts, such as hotline availability, advocacy, or public awareness, that help victims identify options for leaving abusive relationships. By increasing victims' ability or willingness to leave, these services could increase attempts to separate from abusive partners. Because separation is one of the most dangerous periods for victims of intimate partner violence (Domestic Violence Coordinating Council, 2011), increased attempts to leave could increase violence in the short run.

These channels also apply to children. Children exposed to DV are more likely to experience maltreatment themselves. In a nationally representative survey, about one-third of youth who had witnessed partner violence had also been physically abused (Hamby et al., 2010), and the overlap is higher among children of women in DV shelters (Appel & Holden, 1998). Services that help a parent leave safely could therefore reduce children's exposure to violence. At the same time, greater contact between families and service providers, such as hospitals, could increase reports to child protective services.

Together, these channels imply that even when additional grant funding expands shelter resources, its effect on measured county-level violence and child maltreatment is theoretically ambiguous.

3 Data Description

This section describes the data used in the analysis. Section 3.1 describes the DV Shelter Database I construct from IRS Form 990 filings. Sections 3.2–3.4 describe the three data sources I use to measure violence and child maltreatment. The shelter panel covers 2013–2023, while the homicide, hospital discharge, and child maltreatment data cover 2013–2019.

3.1 Domestic Violence Shelter Database

No publicly available, longitudinal, comprehensive database of DV shelters exists.[6] Administrative alternatives are limited. CJCC tracks only shelters receiving VOCA grants, and only for a restricted set of years.[7] County Business Patterns (CBP) data combine DV shelters with family, youth, and homeless shelters, so DV shelters cannot be identified separately (Census Bureau, 2023).[8]

DV shelters are nonprofit organizations, which are required to file an annual IRS Form 990 or Form 990-EZ. These filings report detailed financial information as well as descriptions of the organization's mission and programs. Because Form 990 data are reported at the organization level rather than the program level, I use "DV shelter" to refer to the filing organization throughout. For most organizations, the DV shelter and its directly related services constitute the organization's core mission. In a small number of cases, the DV shelter is one program within a larger nonprofit. I use these filings to construct a novel panel of Georgia DV shelters from 2013 to 2023 in three steps.

First, I begin with the universe of roughly one million tax-exempt filers and restrict the sample to Georgia organizations classified under the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) as providing human or health services. I use optical character recognition (OCR)

[6]Many shelters avoid public disclosure of their location and operations for victim safety reasons.

[7]Four Georgia DV shelters receive no government grants in at least one sample year and do not appear in CJCC records for those years.

[8]For example, CBP data indicate that four Georgia counties gained their first shelter (using the CBP's broader shelter classification) during the sample period, but the DV Shelter Database I construct from Form 990 filings shows that two of these counties already had operating DV shelters.

to extract mission and program statements from each organization's two most recent Form 990 filings[9] and flag organizations whose statements include DV-related terms. I construct the list of DV-related terms by reviewing Form 990 filings for shelters identified through an independent online search (Appendix A.1).

Second, I use a document processing model built in Microsoft Power Automate's AI Builder to extract structured data from each flagged organization's 2013–2023 filings, including total revenue, government grants, program service expenses, officer compensation, and mission statement text.[10] I trained the model on 30 manually labeled filings for each form type, Form 990 and Form 990-EZ. Because extraction accuracy varied substantially across fields, I manually verified every extracted value against the original filing and corrected errors by hand. The extracted address is the organization's business address, which is typically a PO box rather than the shelter's physical location. I assign each shelter to the county of its reported business address.[11]

Finally, I cross-validate the resulting shelter list against records from the CJCC, DomesticShelters.org, and the GCADV. I use archived versions of these sources from the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine, along with archived news reports, to determine when organizations began or ended shelter services. This process identifies 48 DV shelters operating in Georgia during the sample period. No shelter opens or closes during this period. I exclude one shelter operated by a large national nonprofit because its parent organization files a consolidated Form 990 that does not separately report the shelter's finances. Because it is the only shelter in Houston County, I also exclude Houston County from the county-level analysis. I exclude a second shelter because it is a small program within a large multi-service nonprofit whose finances primarily reflect other activities. This shelter is one

[9] I use the two most recent filings to limit the computational burden of the initial screen. Because the shelter list is cross-validated against independent sources and archival records, shelters not identified in this initial screen can still enter the final sample. Furthermore, organizations serving DV victims typically retain DV-specific language in their mission statements over time.

[10] The complete list of extracted variables is reported in Appendix A.2.

[11] Where shelter websites report the county of physical operation, this county matches the county of the business address on the Form 990 in every case.

of four in DeKalb County, so DeKalb remains in the county-level analysis, with county-level grants aggregated across its other three shelters.

The main explanatory variable is total government grants, reported on Form 990 Part VIII, line 1e. This line combines federal, state, and local government grants, so VOCA grants cannot be separated from other government sources. All dollar amounts are in 2013 dollars. Government grants are missing for 18 of the 512 shelter-years. Seven are Form 990-EZ filings, which do not report government grants separately. The remaining 11 shelter-years lack an available filing. Excluding these observations yields an unbalanced panel of 494 shelter-years from 46 shelters.

VOCA grants follow the federal fiscal year, which runs from October 1 through September 30. I label each grant year by the year in which it begins, so the 2013 grant year runs from October 1, 2013 through September 30, 2014 (federal fiscal year 2014). Shelters define their own fiscal years, so their Form 990 filings do not align with grant years. I assign each filing to the grant year that begins during the shelter's fiscal year. A filing covering July 2013 through June 2014 includes October 1, 2013, so I assign it to the 2013 grant year. A filing covering January through December 2013 is assigned to the same year. Because shelter fiscal years and grant years overlap only partially, some grant revenue may appear in an adjacent filing. I aggregate all violence and maltreatment outcomes to the same October through September grant years, so each observation is a county-grant-year.

3.2 Uniform Crime Reporting Supplemental Homicide Reports

Homicide data come from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting Supplemental Homicide Reports (UCR-SHR), which cover homicides reported by participating Georgia law enforcement agencies (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2013–2019). The UCR-SHR records victim and perpetrator characteristics and the relationship between them, which allows me to identify DV-related homicides. I assign each homicide to the county of the reporting agency.

I construct four measures of lethal violence, two based on the victim-perpetrator

relationship and two that do not rely on relationship coding. DV homicides are incidents in which the perpetrator is the victim's sibling, parent, grandparent, child, or current or former intimate partner. IPV homicides restrict the definition to current or former intimate partners. Although lethal violence is rare, it is widely studied because it is less subject to underreporting than nonlethal DV. However, relationship coding is sometimes missing or unknown, which may lead to undercounting of DV and IPV homicides. The two remaining measures address this concern. The first counts homicides of female victims ages 18–34, the age range with the highest rates of IPV (Black et al., 2011). The second counts homicides of victims under 18, a measure of lethal violence against children. I scale DV and IPV homicides per 100,000 county residents, female homicides per 100,000 female residents ages 18–34, and child homicides per 100,000 residents under 18.

3.3 HCUP Emergency Department and Inpatient Discharge Records

I use Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) Emergency Department and Inpatient Discharge Records (Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project, 2013–2019) to examine nonlethal violence resulting in hospital contact, which is more prevalent than homicide. The data cover the universe of Georgia hospital discharges from 2013 to 2019 and report patients' zip code of residence, sex, age, and up to 25 diagnostic codes for each discharge.

I construct three measures of violence-related hospital discharges. The first two identify IPV- and DV-related discharges using cause-of-injury diagnostic codes for physical, sexual, psychological, and financial abuse.[12] IPV discharges require a code identifying the perpetrator as a current or former intimate partner, while DV discharges also include perpetrators who are other family members. These abuse-coded discharges may reflect not only underlying violence but also victims' help-seeking and providers' identification of abuse. The third measure counts assault discharges for female patients ages 18–34, regardless of whether the discharge includes an abuse code (Aizer, 2010; Geddes & Holz, 2026). This

[12]Diagnostic codes follow ICD-9 classification through the third quarter of 2015 and ICD-10 thereafter. Abuse codes are not mutually exclusive.

measure is therefore less sensitive to how providers classify abuse. I aggregate all measures to the county-fiscal-year level using the patient's zip code of residence. I scale DV and IPV discharges per 100,000 county residents and female assault discharges per 100,000 female residents ages 18–34.

3.4 National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System

Child maltreatment data come from the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System (NCANDS), which contains the child abuse and neglect reports that received a response from state child protective services agencies (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2013–2019). Each observation is a child-report pair, so a report involving two children contributes two observations. I use Georgia data from 2013 to 2019, which cover all Georgia counties. I aggregate reports to the county-fiscal-year level using the county to which each report was first assigned for investigation, which generally corresponds to the child's county of residence.[13]

I construct three measures of child maltreatment and family disruption. The first is the number of substantiated reports, in which a caseworker's investigation confirmed maltreatment. I also measure substantiated reports separately for four age groups (infants and children ages 1–3, 4–10, and 11–17). The second is the number of reports in which foster care was provided as a post-response service, defined as any out-of-home placement exceeding 24 hours. This measure reflects severe family disruption. The third is the number of reports in which DV is flagged as present in the home, regardless of whether the child is the direct victim or the report is substantiated. This measure reflects children's potential exposure to DV even when direct maltreatment is not confirmed. I scale all measures per 100,000 county population under 18.

Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the violence and child maltreatment out-

[13]Four counties with operating DV shelters (Habersham, Henry, Troup, and Whitfield) are served by a Division of Family and Children Services office that also handles cases from a neighboring county. In these counties, the county of assignment may not match the child's county of residence.

comes, all measured at the county-fiscal-year level over 2013–2019. Homicides are rare. The average county records fewer than one IPV homicide per year, and the mean IPV and DV homicide rates are 0.63 and 1.02 per 100,000 residents, respectively. Hospital discharges and child maltreatment reports are considerably more common. The mean DV discharge rate is 12.9 per 100,000 residents, and the mean rate of substantiated maltreatment reports is 664 per 100,000 children.

Table 1: County-Level Violence and Child Maltreatment Outcomes: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	**N**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**
Panel A: UCR Homicide Reports					
IPV homicides[a]	308	0.625	1.226	0	9.346
DV homicides[a]	308	1.017	1.484	0	9.346
Female homicides, ages 18–34[b]	308	2.740	6.776	0	57.400
Child homicides[c]	308	1.462	3.379	0	31.197
Panel B: HCUP Hospital Discharges					
IPV discharges[a]	308	6.059	6.319	0	32.069
DV discharges[a]	308	12.860	12.234	0	76.192
Female assault discharges, ages 18–34[b]	308	536.454	257.097	77.027	1402.761
Panel C: NCANDS Child Maltreatment Reports[c]					
Substantiated reports, infants	308	103.741	78.473	0	353.029
Substantiated reports, ages 1–3	308	126.470	108.880	0	518.176
Substantiated reports, ages 4–10	308	265.663	227.729	0	1002.753
Substantiated reports, ages 11–17	308	167.676	139.174	0	709.503
Substantiated reports, all ages	308	663.551	531.173	0	2511.162
Reports with DV present in home	308	225.736	228.304	0	1283.101
Reports with foster care placement	308	202.576	161.734	0	741.361

Notes: Observations are county-fiscal-years for the 44 counties in the analysis sample, 2013–2019. [a]Per 100,000 total county residents. [b]Per 100,000 female residents ages 18–34. [c]Per 100,000 residents under age 18.

4 The Georgia DV Shelter Landscape

In this section, I document the structure of Georgia's DV shelter sector, including where shelters are located, how their finances and staffing changed over the sample period, and which services they provide. I combine the Form 990 panel with CJCC administrative records on shelter service provision. I first examine the geographic distribution of shelters and trends in their finances and staffing. I then introduce the CJCC records and use them to characterize service provision across shelters.

4.1 Shelter Distribution and Financial Trends

Georgia's 48 DV shelters operate in 45 of the state's 159 counties. DeKalb County, with four shelters, is the only county with more than one. Shelters are concentrated in metropolitan counties. Using the 2013 Rural-Urban Continuum Codes (RUCC), 26 of Georgia's 74 metropolitan counties (RUCC 1–3) host at least one shelter, or 35 percent, compared with 16 percent of small-town and rural counties (RUCC 6–9).

The analysis sample includes only counties with a DV shelter. To show how these counties differ from the rest of Georgia, Table 2 reports county characteristics for shelter and non-shelter counties over 2013–2015, the three years before the VOCA cap expansion. Shelter counties average 123,397 residents, compared with 69,074 in non-shelter counties. Shelter counties also have higher median household income ($45,869 vs. $42,402) and lower poverty rates (20.3 vs. 22.1 percent). The share of residents who are white is nearly identical across the two groups. Female homicide and female assault discharge rates are lower in shelter counties, but the differences are not statistically significant.

Table 2: County Characteristics by Shelter Presence, 2013–2015


	No Shelter ($N = 114$)		Shelter ($N = 45$)		Difference	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Estimate	SE
Demographics						
Total population	69,074	176,443	123,397	141,928	54,232***	19,277
Per capita income ($)	33,000	7,527	34,484	6,414	1,483*	842
Median household income ($)	42,402	10,787	45,869	12,663	3,466**	1,421
Poverty rate (%)	22.13	6.89	20.29	6.78	−1.84**	0.82
Percent female (%)	50.83	2.19	51.19	1.37	0.36*	0.22
Percent white (%)	68.38	15.60	68.16	19.46	−0.22	2.13
Baseline violence rates						
Female homicide	4.39	11.90	3.73	7.59	−0.65	1.25
Female assault discharges	565.54	289.37	545.73	247.64	−19.81	32.44

Notes: The table reports means and standard deviations (SD) for county-year observations from 2013–2015. The difference columns report the difference in means between shelter and non-shelter counties and its heteroskedasticity-robust standard error (SE). Shelter counties include Houston County, whose shelter is excluded from the regression analysis (Section 3.1). Female homicide and female assault discharge rates are measured per 100,000 women ages 18–34. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.


Figure 1 shows government grants to each shelter in 2013 and the change in grants between 2013 and 2018, the year the CVF cap peaked. Funding levels vary substantially across shelters in 2013, and the subsequent changes are not uniform across shelters. I exploit this within-shelter funding variation in the empirical analysis.

Figure 1: Government Grant Distribution and Changes Across Georgia DV Shelters

(a) 2013 Government Grants



(b) Grant Changes 2013–2018



Notes: The left panel shows total government grants for each DV shelter in fiscal year 2013. The right panel shows the change in government grants between 2013 and 2018, in 2013 dollars. Counties in white do not have a DV shelter in the analysis sample. Houston County has a DV shelter that is excluded from the analysis, and DeKalb County's values exclude one of its four shelters (Section 3.1).

Table 3 reports financial characteristics for the 46 shelters in 2013 and 2023, in 2013 dollars. Georgia's DV shelter sector grew substantially over this period. Mean total revenue rose 50 percent, from $870,000 to $1.31 million. Growth was not limited to the largest shelters. Median total revenue rose 42 percent, from $714,500 to $1.02 million. Government grants and private donations grew at similar rates, with government grants making up 64 percent of mean revenue in both years. Compensation remained the largest expenditure category. The mean number of employees rose from 22.5 to 28.9.

Table 3: Georgia DV Shelter Financial Characteristics, 2013 and 2023

	2013			2023			% Change
	Mean	Median	[p25, p75]	Mean	Median	[p25, p75]	in Mean
Revenues ($1,000s)							
Total revenue	870.4	714.5	[527.9, 1,078.1]	1,308.8	1,016.2	[721.9, 1,559.7]	+50%
Government grants	556.5	467.7	[346.9, 697.9]	843.4	646.7	[472.2, 1,075.9]	+52%
Private donations	228.5	128.0	[67.1, 216.9]	359.8	206.5	[117.6, 415.9]	+57%
Program service revenue	25.4	0.0	[0.0, 0.7]	19.7	0.0	[0.0, 0.0]	−22%
Other revenue	77.1	26.9	[1.2, 113.1]	85.8	43.7	[10.3, 125.3]	+11%
Expenditures ($1,000s)							
Total expenditures	793.7	705.2	[507.3, 1,010.9]	1,165.9	953.8	[679.4, 1,461.6]	+47%
Compensation	457.3	421.7	[323.4, 553.9]	667.2	599.7	[423.0, 789.3]	+46%
Fee-for-service	38.7	5.2	[0.0, 21.7]	30.2	11.6	[1.8, 24.5]	−22%
Operations	23.9	13.9	[5.4, 25.3]	46.7	16.8	[9.0, 46.0]	+95%
Occupancy	49.8	43.0	[21.2, 60.0]	66.4	53.5	[37.4, 93.5]	+33%
Other expenditures	224.0	175.4	[103.2, 313.4]	355.4	331.4	[146.7, 436.1]	+59%
Fundraising expenses	36.4	8.5	[0.0, 22.2]	68.5	12.3	[0.0, 31.7]	+88%
Staffing (count)							
Employees	22.5	23.0	[15.5, 27.0]	28.9	28.0	[20.0, 37.0]	+29%
Volunteers	78.5	69.0	[25.0, 96.0]	40.4	30.0	[22.0, 50.0]	−49%

Notes: Each observation is a shelter-year for the 46 shelters in the analysis sample. Dollar amounts are reported in thousands of 2013 dollars. Brackets report the 25th and 75th percentiles. Percent changes compare mean values in 2013 and 2023. Indented expenditure categories sum to total expenditures. Fundraising expenses classify spending by purpose and overlap with these categories. Volunteer counts are reported inconsistently across organizations and years.

4.2 CJCC Administrative Records

CJCC requires shelters receiving VOCA grants to report annual program statistics. I obtained shelter-level records through a direct data request. The records cover 46 of the 47 shelters in the Form 990 database. The remaining shelter receives no government funding and therefore does not report to CJCC. This shelter is included in the financial analysis but not in the service analysis below. For 2018–2022, the records report the number of victims

receiving each of 40 service categories, such as safe housing, crisis lines, and legal assistance. I define a shelter as offering a service in a given year if it reports at least one victim receiving that service. Under this definition, a shelter that offers a service but reports no victims receiving it in a given year is counted as not offering it. Victim counts may include duplicates, since an individual who receives multiple services or uses more than one shelter in the same year is counted more than once. These figures should therefore be interpreted as counts of service instances rather than unique individuals.

4.3 Service Provision Across Georgia Shelters, 2018–2022

I use the CJCC records to characterize which services Georgia shelters provide during 2018–2022, the period for which shelter-by-service data are available. I construct two shelter-level measures for each of 39 services.[14] The first indicates whether a shelter offers the service in at least one year, and the second indicates whether it offers the service in all five years.

All 46 shelters offer the same fourteen services at some point during this period, including safe housing, a staffed crisis line, legal assistance, and transportation assistance (Table 4, Panel A). At the other end of the distribution, four services are offered by fewer than one-fifth of shelters at any point. Three are forensic services, including medical exams and forensic interviews, and the fourth is immigration assistance from an attorney (Panel B). These services likely require partnerships with credentialed providers, such as immigration attorneys or Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners.

Among the remaining services, offering rates vary substantially across shelters and over time. For example, 72 percent of shelters offer civil legal assistance from an attorney for family law matters at some point during the sample period, but only 6.5 percent offer it every year. Similarly, 59 percent offer group therapy at some point, while only 4 percent offer it every year.

This variation over time extends even to near-universal services. All 46 shelters

[14] I exclude the catch-all category "Other Service Provided" because every shelter reports offering it during the sample period.

offer support groups at some point, but only 85 percent offer them every year. All 46 offer assistance applying for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and other government benefits at some point, but only 63 percent offer it every year. Thus, even services that every shelter offers at some point are not reported consistently over time. Some of this variation may reflect years in which a shelter offered a service but reported no victims receiving it, rather than years in which the service was unavailable.

I also examine the number of victims receiving each service annually. Even among the fourteen near-universal services, annual victim counts vary widely across shelters. For example, shelters report an average of 7,599 victims receiving individual support each year, with a standard deviation of 9,926. Table 4 reports the average number of victims per year for the near-universal and least-common services. Appendix Table A.4 reports offering rates and the average number of victims for all 39 services.

Table 4: Georgia Shelter Service Provision, 2018–2022


Service	Ever Offered (%)	Always Offered (%)	Avg. Victims per Year
Panel A: Near-Universal Services (offered at some point by all 46 shelters)			
Crisis Line	100.0	95.7	2,017
Individual Support	100.0	95.7	7,599
Referral to Services, Support, Resources	100.0	95.7	1,107
Transportation Assistance	100.0	93.5	1,297
Safe Housing	100.0	91.3	3,684
Support Group	100.0	84.8	617
Interagency Advocacy	100.0	76.1	823
Non-Emergency Legal Assistance	100.0	73.9	523
Emergency Legal Assistance	100.0	73.9	801
Emergency Financial Assistance	100.0	69.6	178
Criminal Justice Support/Advocacy	100.0	69.6	327
Relocation Assistance	100.0	67.4	210
TANF/Government Benefits Assistance	100.0	63.0	110
Crisis Coordination	100.0	60.9	2,581
Panel B: Least-Common Services (offered at some point by fewer than 20% of shelters)			
Performance of Initial Forensic Medical Exam	19.6	8.7	9.4
Performance of Forensic Interview	17.4	8.7	8.8
Performance of Follow-Up Forensic Medical Exam	17.4	2.2	0.7
Immigration Assistance–Attorney	13.0	0.0	6.9

Notes: Sample includes 46 shelters with CJCC service records, 2018–2022 ($N = 230$ shelter-years). "Ever Offered" is the share of shelters offering the service in at least one year. "Always Offered" is the share offering it in all five years. A shelter offers a service in a year if it reports at least one victim receiving that service. Avg. victims per year is the mean across shelter-years. Data come from the CJCC grantee reports.

5 Empirical Strategy

The empirical strategy exploits within-shelter variation in government grant funding over time. Figure 2 shows the distribution of annual government grants across DV shelters in Georgia from 2013 to 2023. The median grant rises from about $470,000 in 2013–2015 to roughly $800,000 in 2018–2023, with the increase beginning in 2016 as the additional funding made available by the 2015 VOCA cap increase began reaching shelters. The interquartile range also widens after 2015, suggesting that the increase was not uniform across shelters.

Figure 2: Distribution of Annual Government Grants, 2013–2023



Notes: Each box spans the 25th to 75th percentiles of government grants across shelters in that year, and the horizontal line marks the median. Whiskers extend to the most extreme values within 1.5 times the interquartile range, and points beyond this range are plotted individually. Purple boxes indicate 2013–2015 and orange boxes indicate 2016–2023. Grants are measured in $100,000s of 2013 dollars.

5.1 Two-Way Fixed Effects

I estimate the following two-way fixed effects model via Ordinary Least Squares (OLS):

$$Y_{it} = \beta_1 \cdot (\text{Grants}/\$100\text{k})_{it} + \beta_2 \cdot (\text{Grants}/\$100\text{k})_{i,t-1} + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{it}, \tag{1}$$

where Y_{it} is an outcome for unit i in grant year t, α_i denotes unit fixed effects, and γ_t denotes year fixed effects. I estimate this specification at two levels. For shelter finances and staffing, i is a shelter, and the outcomes come from the DV Shelter Database. For violence and child maltreatment, i is a county, and grants are summed across all shelters in the county. DeKalb County is the only county in the analysis sample with multiple shelters. Unit fixed effects absorb time-invariant differences across shelters or counties, such as a shelter's mission focus or a county's baseline level of violence. Year fixed effects absorb changes common to all units in a given year, such as changes in the total VOCA funding available to Georgia. Standard errors are clustered by shelter in shelter-level specifications and by county in county-level specifications.

I include the one-year lag of grant funding for two reasons. First, shelters may not adjust immediately to a change in funding. Hiring staff or expanding programs takes time, so some of a shelter's response to a grant may occur in the following year. Second, the assignment of Form 990 fiscal years to grant years is approximate, so part of a grant may appear on a filing for an adjacent year. Both factors imply that a shelter's response to a change in funding may extend beyond the contemporaneous fiscal year. Because the specification includes lagged grants and grant data begin in 2013, the financial regressions cover 2014–2023 and the violence and child maltreatment regressions cover 2014–2019.

I therefore report the contemporaneous effect β_1, the lagged effect β_2, and their sum $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ throughout the paper, treating the sum as the primary quantity of interest. The sum is the effect on the current-year outcome when grant funding is \$100,000 higher in both the current and previous year. I assess the statistical significance of $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ using a Wald test.

I estimate Equation (1) separately for each outcome. The outcomes fall into three broad categories: (i) revenue and expenditures, (ii) staffing, and (iii) county-level violence and child maltreatment.

5.2 Identification

Treatment in this setting is continuous. Nearly all shelters receive government grants in every year, and funding changes by different amounts each year. A causal interpretation of β_1 and $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ requires four assumptions, described below alongside the evidence used to assess each.

5.2.1 Assumptions

Parallel trends. I assume that, absent changes in grant funding, outcomes would have evolved similarly for shelters that received different funding changes. With continuous treatment, this assumption is stronger than in the binary case, because it must hold across every level of funding change. It would be violated if CJCC directed more funding toward shelters in counties with rising DV rates or toward shelters with growing organizational need. Because CJCC's allocations do not follow a documented formula, I assess this assumption empirically below.

Limited carryover. Finally, I assume that a grant affects outcomes only in the year it is received and the following year. Including the prior-year grant makes this assumption weaker than in a model with only current-year grants, which would require each grant's full effect to occur in the year it is received. This assumption would fail if shelters spread spending from a single grant over more than two years, or if effects on violence take longer than two years to appear. I test this assumption by adding a second lag of grant funding.

5.2.2 Evidence

I assess the parallel trends assumption in three ways, following Alexander and Schnell (2024).

First, I test whether grant funding is associated with county conditions that could also affect outcomes. I regress county economic and demographic characteristics, along with prior-year violence rates, on current-year government grants, and I include shelter and year fixed effects. If CJCC directed more funding toward shelters in counties with changing

economic conditions or rising violence, grants would predict these characteristics. Table 5 reports the estimates. Grants are not significantly associated with county income, poverty, unemployment, racial composition, or prior-year hospital discharge and homicide rates. The one exception is the number of births, which falls by 9.8 for each $100,000 in grants, about 0.5 percent of the county mean. Taken together, the estimates provide little evidence that grants target counties with changing demographics or rising violence.

Second, I estimate an event study around each shelter's initial post VOCA cap expansion funding change. Let $\Delta\text{Grants}_i = \text{Grants}_{i,2016} - \text{Grants}_{i,2015}$, the change in a shelter's grants between 2015 and 2016, measured in $100,000s. For county-level outcomes, ΔGrants_i is the change in total grants across the county's shelters. I use 2016 because it is the first year the VOCA funding increase appears in shelter-level grant data, which limits the extent to which pre-period coefficients reflect the funding increase itself. Not all shelters receive their largest funding change in 2016, since CJCC allocations vary from year to year. The event study therefore traces outcomes following shelters' initial post-expansion funding change, although subsequent changes in funding may also contribute to the estimated effects. I estimate

$$Y_{it} = \sum_{k \neq 2015} \beta_k \cdot \Delta\text{Grants}_i \cdot \mathbf{1}[t = k] + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{it}, \tag{2}$$

where $\mathbf{1}[t = k]$ indicates year k and 2015 is the omitted year. Each β_k measures how much the outcome in year k, relative to 2015, differs for each additional $100,000 of 2016 grant change. Pre-period coefficients ($k < 2016$) show whether shelters with larger 2016 grant changes were already on different paths before the change. However, they cannot directly test the parallel trends assumption, which concerns the evolution of outcomes in the absence of the funding change in 2016.


Table 5: County Characteristics and Government Grants

	Coefficient on Current-Year Grants	Mean
Panel A: Economic characteristics		
Per capita income ($)	77.486	35,864
	(74.676)	
Median household income ($)	−9.197	49,362
	(118.315)	
Poverty rate (%)	0.020	17.36
	(0.046)	
Unemployment rate (%)	0.012	5.20
	(0.021)	
Panel B: Demographic characteristics		
Total births	−9.840***	2,068
	(2.863)	
Percent female	0.008	51.29
	(0.006)	
Percent white	0.029	66.20
	(0.057)	
Percent Black	−0.005	28.82
	(0.051)	
Percent Native American	−0.002	0.56
	(0.003)	
Percent Asian	−0.017	2.35
	(0.027)	
Percent two or more races	−0.004*	1.93
	(0.002)	
Panel C: Prior-year violence rates		
IPV homicides	0.001	0.63
	(0.019)	
DV homicides	0.024	1.10
	(0.023)	
Female homicides, ages 18–34	0.072	3.19
	(0.122)	
IPV discharges	0.051	6.16
	(0.187)	
DV discharges	0.013	12.99
	(0.290)	
Female assault discharges, ages 18–34	1.434	533.63
	(4.514)	


Notes: Each row reports the coefficient from a regression of the county characteristic on current-year government grants ($100,000s, 2013 dollars), with shelter and year fixed effects. Observations are shelter-years, with each shelter matched to its county's characteristics. Violence rates are measured in the year before the grant year, are scaled, and only available up to 2019. Mean is the sample mean of each characteristic. Standard errors, clustered by county, are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure 3: Event Study Estimates of the 2016 Government Grant Change


(a) Total Revenue ($100,000s)




(b) Total Expenditures ($100,000s)



(c) Female Homicides per 100,000 Women Ages 18–34



(d) Female Assault Discharges per 100,000 Women Ages 18–34



Notes: Each panel plots the coefficients β_k and 95 percent confidence intervals from Equation (2). Financial outcomes come from the DV Shelter Database and cover 2013–2023. Violence outcomes come from HCUP discharge records and UCR-SHR data and cover 2013–2019. Event studies for all outcomes are reported in Appendix B.3.

Pre-period coefficients for the financial outcomes are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero, which is consistent with parallel trends for revenue and expenditures. Violence outcomes are rare at the county level, so the pre-period coefficients are less precisely estimated and less informative about pre-trends. The results presented in Table 5, which show no relationship between grants and prior-year violence rates, provide additional support for these specifications.

Third, I examine what predicts CJCC grant allocations. Appendix B.2 reports the full analysis, and I summarize the main findings here. Grant funding is highly persistent across years. Neither baseline funding levels nor pre-VOCA cap expansion funding trends

predict post-expansion grant growth. Because the specification includes shelter fixed effects, the more important question is whether time-varying shelter or county characteristics predict year-to-year changes in grants. No lagged shelter or county characteristic individually predicts grant changes at the 5 percent level, although the characteristics are jointly significant. Prior-year increases in IPV and female homicide rates predict smaller grant changes, but neither relationship survives correction for multiple testing. Taken together, the analyses provide little evidence that CJCC directs more funding toward shelters facing rising need.

6 Results

This section first shows how government grants affect shelter finances and staffing, then turns to county-level violence and child maltreatment. Throughout, I focus on $\beta_1 + \beta_2$, the effect on the current-year outcome when grants are \$100,000 higher in both the current and prior year. Government grants increase shelter revenue, and I find no evidence that they reduce private donations on average. Shelters spend much of the additional revenue, and employee counts rise. I find little evidence of changes in county-level violence or child maltreatment.

6.1 Effects on Shelter Finances

Because government grants are a component of revenue, total revenue would rise one-for-one with grants if other revenue sources did not adjust. Table 6 reports the effects of government grants on each revenue source. When grants are \$100,000 higher in both the current and prior year, total revenue rises by \$86,700. The combined effect on private donations is −\$12,500 and is not statistically distinguishable from zero. The 95 percent confidence interval for the combined estimate rules out declines in donations larger than about 31 cents per grant dollar. By contrast, the broader nonprofit literature finds that government grants displace roughly 70 to 75 cents of private giving per dollar (Andreoni & Payne, 2003, 2011).

Because total revenue rises while private donations do not, the share of revenue from

government grants mechanically rises. Columns 5–8 of Table 6 report effects on each source's share of total revenue. The share from government grants rises by 2.8 percentage points, and the share from private donations falls by 2.1 percentage points. Effects on the shares from other revenue and program service revenue are small, and only the effect on other revenue share is statistically significant, at the 10 percent level.

Table 6: Effects of Government Grants on DV Shelter Revenue

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Revenue Amounts ($100,000s)				Revenue Shares			
	Total Revenue	Private Donations	Program Revenue	Other Revenue	Government Grants	Private Donations	Program Revenue	Other Revenue
Government Grants, Current Year ($100,000s)	0.554***	-0.452***	0.017	-0.011	0.037***	-0.035***	-0.000	-0.002
	(0.157)	(0.166)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Government Grants, Prior Year ($100,000s)	0.314**	0.327**	0.011	-0.025	-0.009**	0.013**	0.001	-0.005
	(0.133)	(0.144)	(0.016)	(0.034)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Combined Effect (Current + Prior Year)	0.867***	-0.125	0.028	-0.036	0.028***	-0.021***	0.001	-0.008*
	(0.098)	(0.094)	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Sample Mean	11.457	2.702	0.245	0.768	0.680	0.226	0.022	0.072
Observations	442	442	442	442	442	442	442	442

Notes: Observations are shelter-years, 2014–2023. All regressions include shelter and year fixed effects. The combined effect is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$, the effect on the current-year outcome when government grants are $100,000 higher in both the current and prior year. Its standard error is computed via a Wald test that accounts for the covariance between β_1 and β_2. Dollar amounts are in 2013 dollars. Private donations include fundraising event revenue and direct contributions (Form 990 Part VIII, lines 1c and 1f). Program revenue is program service revenue (Part VIII, line 2). Other revenue includes federated campaigns, membership dues, grants from related organizations, and miscellaneous receipts. Standard errors, clustered by shelter, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 7 reports the effects of government grants on expenditures. When grants are $100,000 higher in both the current and prior year, total expenditures rise by $73,300. Shelters therefore spend about 85 percent of the additional revenue within this period. Spending on each shelter's primary program, its largest program as measured by expenses, accounts for 92 percent of the increase in expenditures. Form 990 reports total spending on this program but does not show how it is divided across services such as counseling, legal aid, and housing assistance.

Column 3 reports fundraising expenses, which, like primary program spending, clas-

sify spending by purpose and overlap with the other expense categories. The combined effect on fundraising expenses is $4,800 and not statistically significant, and the 95 percent confidence interval rules out reductions larger than $2,300. Together with the results for private donations, this suggests that shelters do not reduce fundraising effort when government grants rise.

Columns 4–8 divide total expenditures by type of expense. Compensation accounts for just over half of the increase in total expenditures, rising by $39,300. Other expenditures rise by $22,200. This residual category combines supplies, maintenance, bank fees, and miscellaneous items. Effects on the remaining categories are small. Occupancy expenditures, which include rent, utilities, and other facility costs, rise by $2,300, an estimate significant only at the 10 percent level. An increase this small, less than 4 percent of the sample mean, provides little evidence that shelters acquire additional space. The effects on contract work and operation-related expenses are not statistically significant.

Table 7: Effects of Government Grants on DV Shelter Expenditures

		By Purpose		By Type				
	(1) Total Expenditures	(2) Primary Program	(3) Fundraising	(4) Compensation	(5) Contract Work	(6) Operations	(7) Occupancy	(8) Other
				($100,000s)				
Government Grants, Current Year ($100,000s)	0.542***	0.439***	0.040	0.311***	0.043**	0.033	-0.009	0.164***
	(0.076)	(0.058)	(0.028)	(0.057)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.045)
Government Grants, Prior Year ($100,000s)	0.191***	0.235***	0.008	0.083*	0.028	-0.008	0.031**	0.058
	(0.054)	(0.037)	(0.012)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.043)
Combined Effect (Current + Prior Year)	0.733***	0.675***	0.048	0.393***	0.071	0.025	0.023*	0.222***
	(0.089)	(0.072)	(0.036)	(0.063)	(0.046)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.072)
Sample Mean	10.674	8.079	0.459	6.245	0.461	0.416	0.589	2.963
Observations	442	442	442	442	442	442	442	442

Notes: Observations are shelter-years, 2014–2023. All regressions include shelter and year fixed effects. The combined effect is $\beta_1+\beta_2$, the effect on the current-year outcome when government grants are $100,000 higher in both the current and prior year. Its standard error is computed via a Wald test that accounts for the covariance between β_1 and β_2. Dollar amounts are in 2013 dollars. Primary program expenditure (column 2) and fundraising expenses (column 3, Form 990 Part I, line 16b) classify spending by purpose and overlap with the expense categories in columns 4–8. Compensation includes officer and employee salaries, benefits, and payroll taxes (Form 990 Part IX, lines 5–10) and excludes contract workers. Contract work includes all fee-for-service expenditures (line 11). Operations includes office, information technology, advertising, travel, and conference expenditures. Occupancy includes rent, utilities, and other facility costs (line 16). Other is a residual category that includes supplies, maintenance, bank fees, and miscellaneous items. Columns 4–8 sum to total expenditures. Standard errors, clustered by shelter, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

6.2 Effects on Staffing

Staffing determines how many victims a shelter can serve, since each advocate carries a caseload. Table 8 reports effects on employee and volunteer counts. Columns 1 and 2 repeat the compensation and contract work estimates from Table 7 for comparison.

Employee count comes from Form 990 Part I, line 5, which reports the total number of individuals employed during the calendar year ending within the shelter's fiscal year. Because this measure counts everyone employed at any point during the year, an increase could reflect both new hires and employee turnover. It is also measured on a calendar-year basis rather than the shelter's fiscal year, so part of a staffing response may appear on the following year's filing.

When grants are $100,000 higher in both the current and prior year, employee counts rise by 1.07, or 3.8 percent of the sample mean. At the sample mean of $21,900 in compensation per employee, 1.07 additional employees account for about 60 percent of the $39,300 increase in compensation. Higher turnover alone would likely lower compensation per employee, since more employees would work only part of the year. Instead, compensation per employee rises by $360, although the estimate is significant only at the 10 percent level. This pattern is more consistent with shelters adding staff, although this measure cannot fully separate added positions from turnover. The employee count estimate is similar in a balanced panel of the 37 shelters that report employee counts in every year (Appendix Table C.2).

The combined effect on volunteer counts is negative but not statistically significant. This estimate comes from a smaller sample, since fewer shelters report volunteer counts consistently. Because VOCA requires grant recipients to use volunteers (28 C.F.R. § 94.113), shelters cannot fully replace volunteers with paid staff.

Table 8: Effects of Government Grants on DV Shelter Staffing

	(1) Compensation ($100,000s)	(2) Contract Work ($100,000s)	(3) Employee Count	(4) Volunteer Count	(5) Compensation per Employee ($100,000s)
Government Grants, Current Year ($100,000s)	0.311***	0.043**	0.488**	-4.909**	0.006**
	(0.057)	(0.020)	(0.202)	(2.330)	(0.002)
Government Grants, Prior Year ($100,000s)	0.083*	0.028	0.577***	0.475	-0.003
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.202)	(1.860)	(0.002)
Combined Effect (Current + Prior Year)	0.393***	0.071	1.065***	-4.434	0.004*
	(0.063)	(0.046)	(0.193)	(3.036)	(0.002)
Sample Mean	6.245	0.461	28.05	66.27	0.219
Observations	442	442	440	263	440

Notes: Observations are shelter-years, 2014–2023. All regressions include shelter and year fixed effects. The combined effect is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$, the effect on the current-year outcome when government grants are $100,000 higher in both the current and prior year. Its standard error is computed via a Wald test that accounts for the covariance between β_1 and β_2. Dollar amounts are in 2013 dollars. Compensation includes officer and employee salaries, benefits, and payroll taxes (Form 990 Part IX, lines 5–10) and excludes contract workers. Contract work includes all fee-for-service expenditures, including payments to independent contractors. Employee count is the total number of individuals employed during the calendar year (Form 990 Part I, line 5). Compensation per employee is total compensation divided by employee count. Sample sizes vary because of item-level missingness. Standard errors, clustered by shelter, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

6.3 Effects on Violence and Child Maltreatment

Additional shelter resources could affect county-level violence through three channels. Additional staff could improve services for existing clients. Increased staffing could also expand shelter capacity to serve new victims, allowing more victims to access services and potentially reducing violence, although greater engagement with service providers could also increase reporting. Finally, staff could expand outreach efforts, encouraging victims who might not otherwise seek help to leave abusive relationships. The effect on violence would depend in part on whether victims can leave safely, given the heightened risk of violence surrounding separation. The channels have opposing implications for measured violence, so the net effect is an empirical question.

Tables 9 to 11 report effects on county-level hospital discharges, homicides, and child

maltreatment reports. To account for testing several related measures, I apply a Benjamini-Hochberg correction to the combined effects within each data source.[15]

Table 9 reports effects on hospital discharge rates. The effects on IPV and DV discharges are small and not statistically significant. The 95 percent confidence intervals range from a 5.9 percent decline to a 2.5 percent increase for IPV discharges and from a 5.5 percent decline to a 4.9 percent increase for DV discharges, relative to their respective sample means. For female assault discharges, the combined effect is an increase of 8.0 discharges per 100,000 women ages 18–34, or 1.5 percent of the sample mean. This estimate is significant only at the 10 percent level and does not survive the Benjamini-Hochberg correction. Its confidence interval ranges from roughly zero to an increase of 3.1 percent, so it rules out meaningful declines in female assault discharges. The Poisson estimate on this outcome is similar in magnitude and significant at the 5 percent level (Appendix Table C.3).

[15]I apply the correction separately by data source, with 4 tests for homicide measures, 3 for hospital discharges, and 7 for child maltreatment. I set the false discovery rate to q = 0.10, consistent with the significance threshold used throughout the paper.

Table 9: Effects of Government Grants on Hospital Discharges

	(1) IPV Discharges	(2) DV Discharges	(3) Female Assault Discharges, Ages 18–34
Government Grants, Current Year ($100,000s)	0.004	-0.059	-2.429
	(0.165)	(0.216)	(3.076)
Government Grants, Prior Year ($100,000s)	-0.105	0.025	10.468**
	(0.182)	(0.315)	(3.886)
Combined Effect (Current + Prior Year)	-0.101	-0.034	8.039*
	(0.127)	(0.318)	(4.277)
Sample Mean	5.956	11.979	535.061
Observations	264	264	264

Notes: Observations are county-years for the 44 counties in the analysis sample, 2014–2019. All regressions include county and year fixed effects. Grants are in 2013 dollars. The combined effect is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$, the effect on the current-year outcome when government grants are $100,000 higher in both the current and prior year. The standard error for the sum is computed via a Wald test that accounts for the covariance between β_1 and β_2. Columns 1 and 2 are per 100,000 county residents, and column 3 is per 100,000 women ages 18–34. IPV discharges require a code identifying a current or former intimate partner as the perpetrator, and DV discharges also include other family members. Discharges include emergency department and inpatient records. Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimates appear in Appendix Table C.3. Standard errors, clustered by county, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 10 reports effects on homicide rates. None of the four combined effects is statistically significant, and the confidence intervals are wide. Across the four measures, the intervals include declines of up to 34 percent and increases of up to 18 percent of the sample mean, so moderate effects in either direction cannot be ruled out. For IPV homicides, the current-year and prior-year coefficients are each significant at the 5 percent level but opposite in sign, and their sum is small and not statistically significant, even before correction. Given the approximate alignment of Form 990 filings with grant years, I focus on the sum of the coefficients rather than interpreting the individual estimates separately.

Table 10: Effects of Government Grants on Homicides

	(1) IPV Homicides	(2) DV Homicides	(3) Female Homicides, Ages 18–34	(4) Child Homicides
Government Grants, Current Year ($100,000s)	-0.067**	-0.005	-0.266	-0.037
	(0.033)	(0.074)	(0.281)	(0.065)
Government Grants, Prior Year ($100,000s)	0.100**	0.059	-0.056	0.016
	(0.049)	(0.065)	(0.211)	(0.097)
Combined Effect (Current + Prior Year)	0.034	0.054	-0.322	-0.021
	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.282)	(0.118)
Sample Mean	0.566	0.982	2.541	1.417
Observations	264	264	264	264

Notes: Observations are county-years for the 44 counties in the analysis sample, 2014–2019. All regressions include county and year fixed effects. Grants are in 2013 dollars. The combined effect is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$, the effect on the current-year outcome when government grants are $100,000 higher in both the current and prior year. Its standard error is computed via a Wald test that accounts for the covariance between β_1 and β_2. Columns 1 and 2 are per 100,000 county residents, column 3 is per 100,000 women ages 18–34, and column 4 is per 100,000 residents under 18. Homicide data come from the UCR-SHR. Child homicides include any homicide of a victim under 18, regardless of the perpetrator's relationship to the victim. Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimates appear in Appendix Table C.4. Standard errors, clustered by county, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 11 reports effects on child maltreatment reports. None of the seven combined effects is statistically significant, but these estimates are more precise than the homicide estimates. Across the seven measures, the confidence intervals include declines of up to 5.3 percent and increases of up to 5.2 percent of the sample mean.

Table 11: Effects of Government Grants on Child Maltreatment Reports

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Substantiated reports					All reports	
	All ages	Infants	Ages 1–3	Ages 4–10	Ages 11–17	DV in Home	Foster Care
Grants, current year	−10.060	−0.833	−1.909	−3.480	−3.839*	−2.798	−0.588
	(8.154)	(1.359)	(1.874)	(3.921)	(2.089)	(3.398)	(2.092)
Grants, prior year	10.817	0.696	2.426	5.257	2.438	4.837	−0.290
	(11.309)	(1.397)	(2.283)	(5.133)	(3.128)	(4.335)	(2.055)
Combined effect	0.757	−0.136	0.517	1.778	−1.401	2.039	−0.879
	(13.220)	(2.047)	(2.491)	(5.818)	(3.666)	(3.768)	(2.132)
Sample mean	655.9	104.6	123.3	261.5	166.5	199.9	208.7
Observations	264	264	264	264	264	264	264

Notes: Observations are county-years for the 44 counties in the analysis sample, 2014–2019. All regressions include county and year fixed effects. Grants are measured in $100,000s of 2013 dollars. The combined effect is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$, the effect on the current-year outcome when government grants are $100,000 higher in both the current and prior year. Its standard error is computed via a Wald test that accounts for the covariance between β_1 and β_2. All outcomes are per 100,000 residents under 18. Column 6 is the rate of reports in which DV is flagged as present in the home, regardless of substantiation. Column 7 is the rate of reports in which foster care was provided as a post-response service. Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimates appear in Appendix Table C.5. Standard errors, clustered by county, in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Overall, the combined effect is not statistically significant for any violence or child maltreatment outcome after correcting for multiple testing. The estimates rule out reductions larger than 5.9 percent of the sample mean in hospital discharges and 5.3 percent in child maltreatment reports, although smaller, potentially meaningful reductions remain possible. Homicide estimates are less precise, with confidence intervals that include moderate effects in either direction. The positive estimate for female assault discharges, while not significant after correcting for multiple testing, could reflect increased reporting as more victims connect with services or heightened violence surrounding attempts to leave abusive relationships. More generally, the near-zero combined effects could reflect either limited effects of additional shelter funding or offsetting effects across the different channels through which funding may

influence violence.

6.4 Heterogeneity by Shelter Size

The main specification assumes that each additional $100,000 in government grants has the same effect on every shelter. This assumption may not hold across shelters of different sizes. A $100,000 increase is a much larger share of the budget for a small shelter than for a large one. At the same time, larger or more established shelters may convert grants into program expansion more effectively than smaller shelters. To examine this, I estimate Equation (1) separately for small, medium, and large shelters, defined by terciles of 2013 total revenue. Small shelters had 2013 revenue below $565,000, medium shelters between $573,000 and $935,000, and large shelters above $992,000 (Table 12).


Table 12: Size Tercile Cutoffs

	Total Revenue 2013				
Tercile	*N*	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Small	16	$440,218	$112,917	$179,782	$564,403
Medium	15	$724,836	$109,233	$572,625	$935,437
Large	15	$1,474,837	$652,383	$992,044	$2,740,121

Notes: Terciles are defined based on each shelter's total revenue in 2013.

Figure 4 shows the change in government grants between 2013 and 2018 for shelters in each tercile. Medium and large shelters experienced the largest level changes in funding over this period but all tercile groupings have meaningful variation in grant changes over the sample period.

Figure 4: Change in Government Grants, 2013–2018, by Shelter Size



Notes: The figure shows the change in total government grants (2013 dollars) for each DV shelter between fiscal years 2013 and 2018. Counties in white do not have a DV shelter in the analysis sample. Shelter size terciles are defined by 2013 total revenue.

Tables 13 to 18 report the current-year, prior-year, and combined effects for each tercile. For county-level outcomes, I assign counties to terciles based on the total 2013 revenue of their shelters, using the same cutoffs as in the shelter-level anallysis. This distinction matters only for DeKalb County, whose three shelters include two large shelters and one small shelter; their combined revenue places the county in the large tercile. Because the tercile regressions use non-overlapping sets of shelters and counties, I test whether the combined effects differ across terciles using pairwise z-tests (Appendix C.4). These estimates should be interpreted cautiously as each tercile contains only 15 or 16 shelters.

Medium shelters respond most to additional government funding. When grants are $100,000 higher in both the current and prior year, total revenue rises by $105,100 at medium shelters, compared with $50,600 at small shelters and $77,800 at large shelters. Similarly, total expenditures rise by $106,200 at medium shelters, versus $44,900 and $63,100 at small and large shelters, respectively. Employee counts also rise more at medium shelters (1.82) than at small (0.86) or large (0.84) shelters. For each of these outcomes, as well as primary

program spending and compensation, the medium-shelter estimate is significantly larger than both the small- and large-shelter estimates at the 5 percent level. The small- and large-shelter estimates do not differ from each other.

Small shelters experience significant crowd-out of private donations. When grants are $100,000 higher in both the current and prior year, donations fall by $35,100 at small shelters, or 35 cents per grant dollar. Donations at medium shelters do not change, and the difference between the two estimates is statistically significant ($p = 0.010$). This difference accounts for a large share of the gap in revenue responses between small and medium shelters. Donations at large shelters fall by $22,300, an estimate significant only at the 10 percent level and not statistically different from the small-shelter estimate ($p = 0.43$). The pooled estimate of −$12,500 from Table 6 therefore combines declines at small and large shelters with no change at medium shelters.

For county-level violence and child maltreatment, the tercile estimates show no consistent pattern. Of the 42 tercile-specific combined effects, four are statistically significant at the 10 percent level, close to the number expected by chance. These four estimates do not point in a common direction. In medium-tercile counties, where shelter revenue and staffing respond most, female assault discharges rise by 6 percent of the sample mean, while substantiated reports among children ages 11–17 fall by 9 percent. Female homicides fall by 53 percent of the sample mean in small-tercile counties and rise by 11 percent in large-tercile counties.[16]

Overall, the organizational response to additional funding is largest at medium shelters. Private donations fall at small shelters, and less precisely at large shelters, but not at medium shelters. For violence and child maltreatment, the tercile estimates show no consistent pattern across outcomes or shelter sizes.

[16]Excluding DeKalb County reduces the precision of the large-tercile estimates but does not change these conclusions.

Table 13: Effects of Government Grants on DV Shelter Revenue by Shelter Size

		Revenue Amounts ($100,000s)				Revenue Shares			
		Total Revenue	Private Donations	Program Revenue	Other Revenue	Government Grants	Private Donations	Program Revenue	Other Revenue
Small	Current year	0.636***	-0.364	0.004	-0.004	0.073**	-0.071**	0.000	-0.002
		(0.203)	(0.222)	(0.004)	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.001)	(0.010)
	Prior year	-0.130	0.013	0.012	-0.155	0.011	0.019	0.002	-0.032**
		(0.086)	(0.145)	(0.010)	(0.102)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.002)	(0.015)
	Combined	0.506**	-0.351***	0.017	-0.159*	0.084***	-0.052*	0.002	-0.034***
		(0.190)	(0.105)	(0.012)	(0.082)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.002)	(0.010)
	Sample Mean	6.321	1.250	0.045	0.290	0.708	0.223	0.009	0.060
	Observations	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150
Medium	Current year	1.049***	0.036	-0.010	0.023	0.029**	-0.023	-0.003*	-0.003
		(0.101)	(0.114)	(0.008)	(0.029)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.001)	(0.005)
	Prior year	0.001	-0.056	0.030	0.028	-0.011	0.003	0.005	0.004
		(0.143)	(0.137)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.005)
	Combined	1.051***	-0.020	0.020	0.051*	0.017**	-0.020**	0.002	0.001
		(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)
	Sample Mean	9.893	2.079	0.366	0.695	0.679	0.207	0.042	0.072
	Observations	142	142	142	142	142	142	142	142
Large	Current year	0.274	-0.722***	0.028	-0.032	0.035***	-0.033***	-0.001	-0.002
		(0.189)	(0.231)	(0.036)	(0.058)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.004)
	Prior year	0.504**	0.500**	-0.000	0.005	-0.010***	0.010**	-0.000	-0.000
		(0.182)	(0.211)	(0.018)	(0.047)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.004)
	Combined	0.778***	-0.223*	0.028	-0.027	0.025***	-0.022***	-0.001	-0.002
		(0.118)	(0.126)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.004)
	Sample Mean	18.074	4.744	0.330	1.316	0.653	0.247	0.016	0.084
	Observations	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150

Notes: Each panel reports estimates from a separate regression for shelters in that size tercile (2013 total revenue). Observations are shelter-years, 2014–2023. Current year and prior year report the coefficients on current-year and prior-year government grants ($100,000s, 2013 dollars). Combined is their sum, the effect on the current-year outcome when grants are $100,000 higher in both the current and prior year, with its standard error computed via a Wald test. Column definitions match Table 6. All regressions include shelter and year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered by shelter, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 14: Effects of Government Grants on DV Shelter Expenditures by Shelter Size

		Total Expenditures	Primary Program	Compen-sation	Contract Work ($100,000s)	Opera-tions	Occu-pancy	Fund-raising	Other
Small	Current year	0.247**	0.228**	0.143**	0.006**	-0.004	0.020***	-0.005	0.082**
		(0.098)	(0.081)	(0.065)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.033)
	Prior year	0.202	0.227***	0.136	0.004	0.022**	0.014	0.007	0.027
		(0.138)	(0.060)	(0.087)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.060)
	Combined	0.449*	0.456***	0.278*	0.010**	0.018**	0.034**	0.002	0.109
		(0.219)	(0.091)	(0.144)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.005)	(0.074)
	Sample Mean	5.903	4.427	3.698	0.145	0.208	0.359	0.072	1.493
	Observations	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150
Medium	Current year	0.656***	0.557***	0.348***	-0.007	0.085**	0.016**	0.012	0.214***
		(0.069)	(0.074)	(0.058)	(0.016)	(0.038)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.068)
	Prior year	0.406***	0.374***	0.269***	-0.002	-0.019	0.055	-0.008	0.103
		(0.107)	(0.118)	(0.043)	(0.016)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.011)	(0.060)
	Combined	1.062***	0.931***	0.617***	-0.009	0.066***	0.072**	0.004	0.316***
		(0.060)	(0.098)	(0.069)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.028)	(0.006)	(0.090)
	Sample Mean	9.285	7.206	5.606	0.231	0.373	0.579	0.348	2.496
	Observations	142	142	142	142	142	142	142	142
Large	Current year	0.510***	0.423***	0.291***	0.082**	0.021	-0.029	0.070	0.145
		(0.113)	(0.103)	(0.081)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.061)	(0.084)
	Prior year	0.121**	0.160***	0.028	0.048	-0.014	0.035	-0.012	0.024
		(0.046)	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.069)	(0.012)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.051)
	Combined	0.631***	0.582***	0.319***	0.130	0.007	0.006	0.058	0.170
		(0.122)	(0.107)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.050)	(0.106)
	Sample Mean	16.761	12.559	9.396	0.995	0.664	0.829	0.953	4.876
	Observations	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150

Notes: Each panel reports estimates from a separate regression for shelters in that size tercile (2013 total revenue). Observations are shelter-years, 2014–2023. Current year and prior year report the coefficients on current-year and prior-year government grants ($100,000s, 2013 dollars). Combined is their sum, the effect on the current-year outcome when grants are $100,000 higher in both the current and prior year, with its standard error computed via a Wald test. Column definitions match Table 7. All regressions include shelter and year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered by shelter, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 15: Effects of Government Grants on DV Shelter Staffing by Shelter Size

		Compensation ($100,000s)	Contract Work ($100,000s)	Employee Count	Volunteer Count	Compensation per Employee ($100,000s)
Small	Current year	0.143**	0.006**	0.641***	-0.377	0.002
		(0.065)	(0.003)	(0.201)	(0.901)	(0.003)
	Prior year	0.136	0.004	0.216	-0.368	0.004
		(0.087)	(0.003)	(0.311)	(1.464)	(0.006)
	Combined	0.278*	0.010**	0.857**	-0.744	0.006
		(0.144)	(0.005)	(0.300)	(1.146)	(0.008)
	Sample Mean	3.698	0.145	16.567	31.677	0.203
	Observations	150	150	150	93	150
Medium	Current year	0.348***	-0.007	0.153	-1.979	0.015
		(0.058)	(0.016)	(0.399)	(5.145)	(0.009)
	Prior year	0.269***	-0.002	1.667***	-0.487	-0.009
		(0.043)	(0.016)	(0.378)	(4.480)	(0.006)
	Combined	0.617***	-0.009	1.820***	-2.466	0.007*
		(0.069)	(0.012)	(0.182)	(6.754)	(0.004)
	Sample Mean	5.606	0.231	30.169	64.034	0.200
	Observations	142	142	142	89	142
Large	Current year	0.291***	0.082**	0.403	-9.438*	0.004**
		(0.081)	(0.034)	(0.334)	(5.088)	(0.002)
	Prior year	0.028	0.048	0.441	0.831	-0.001
		(0.039)	(0.069)	(0.289)	(2.309)	(0.002)
	Combined	0.319***	0.130	0.844**	-8.607	0.003
		(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.319)	(4.741)	(0.002)
	Sample Mean	9.396	0.995	37.655	108.457	0.254
	Observations	150	150	148	81	148

Notes: Each panel reports estimates from a separate regression for shelters in that size tercile (2013 total revenue). Observations are shelter-years, 2014–2023. Current year and prior year report the coefficients on current-year and prior-year government grants ($100,000s, 2013 dollars). Combined is their sum, the effect on the current-year outcome when grants are $100,000 higher in both the current and prior year, with its standard error computed via a Wald test. Column definitions match Table 8. Sample sizes vary because of item-level missingness. All regressions include shelter and year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered by shelter, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 16: Effects of Government Grants on Hospital Discharges by Shelter Size

		IPV Discharges	DV Discharges	Female Assault Discharges, Ages 18–34
Small	Current year	-0.520*	-0.612	-6.361
		(0.249)	(0.418)	(7.296)
	Prior year	0.284	0.498	24.523**
		(0.372)	(0.624)	(10.695)
	Combined	-0.236	-0.114	18.162
		(0.433)	(0.774)	(11.587)
	Sample Mean	5.928	11.700	661.425
	Observations	90	90	90
Medium	Current year	-0.346**	-0.441	6.537
		(0.150)	(0.623)	(7.983)
	Prior year	0.077	0.391	25.155**
		(0.330)	(0.828)	(10.508)
	Combined	-0.269	-0.050	31.692**
		(0.351)	(1.324)	(14.524)
	Sample Mean	6.140	12.603	508.507
	Observations	90	90	90
Large	Current year	0.463*	0.407	-0.856
		(0.244)	(0.337)	(4.616)
	Prior year	-0.376	-0.277	1.966
		(0.215)	(0.374)	(4.471)
	Combined	0.087	0.130	1.110
		(0.166)	(0.263)	(3.839)
	Sample Mean	5.789	11.610	428.123
	Observations	84	84	84

Notes: Each panel reports estimates from a separate regression for counties in that size tercile, based on the total 2013 revenue of the county's shelters and the shelter cutoffs in Table 12. Observations are county-years, 2014–2019. Current year and prior year report the coefficients on current-year and prior-year government grants ($100,000s, 2013 dollars). Combined is their sum, the effect on the current-year outcome when grants are $100,000 higher in both the current and prior year, with its standard error computed via a Wald test. Column definitions match Table 9. All regressions include county and year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered by county, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 17: Effects of Government Grants on Homicides by Shelter Size

		IPV Homicides	DV Homicides	Female Homicides, Ages 18–34	Child Homicides
Small	Current year	-0.058	0.273**	-1.516**	-0.042
		(0.051)	(0.115)	(0.578)	(0.109)
	Prior year	0.266*	-0.044	-0.492	-0.030
		(0.150)	(0.117)	(0.834)	(0.217)
	Combined	0.207	0.229	-2.008*	-0.072
		(0.120)	(0.132)	(0.973)	(0.152)
	Sample Mean	0.633	1.142	3.805	1.053
	Observations	90	90	90	90
Medium	Current year	-0.182***	-0.232***	0.154	0.034
		(0.052)	(0.070)	(0.206)	(0.158)
	Prior year	0.170**	0.229***	-0.268	0.045
		(0.061)	(0.076)	(0.243)	(0.190)
	Combined	-0.012	-0.003	-0.114	0.079
		(0.056)	(0.066)	(0.208)	(0.267)
	Sample Mean	0.630	0.962	2.189	1.342
	Observations	90	90	90	90
Large	Current year	0.020	0.056	-0.057	-0.049
		(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.073)	(0.140)
	Prior year	-0.007	-0.041	0.228*	-0.028
		(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.122)	(0.148)
	Combined	0.013	0.015	0.171**	-0.077
		(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.068)	(0.137)
	Sample Mean	0.426	0.832	1.564	1.886
	Observations	84	84	84	84

Notes: Each panel reports estimates from a separate regression for counties in that size tercile, based on the total 2013 revenue of the county's shelters and the shelter cutoffs in Table 12. Observations are county-years, 2014–2019. Current year and prior year report the coefficients on current-year and prior-year government grants ($100,000s, 2013 dollars). Combined is their sum, the effect on the current-year outcome when grants are $100,000 higher in both the current and prior year, with its standard error computed via a Wald test. Column definitions match Table 10. All regressions include county and year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered by county, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 18: Effects of Government Grants on Child Maltreatment Reports by Shelter Size

		Substantiated Reports					DV Present	Foster Care
		All Ages	Infants	Ages 1–3	Ages 4–10	Ages 11–17	in Home	Placement
Small	Current year	-5.710	-1.651	-2.274	2.438	-4.222	-7.792	0.234
		(11.121)	(3.180)	(1.995)	(5.890)	(3.145)	(4.943)	(3.037)
	Prior year	28.482	-2.772	11.029	8.827	11.398	15.213	4.387
		(51.580)	(7.921)	(8.844)	(21.877)	(13.582)	(16.772)	(7.625)
	Combined	22.773	-4.424	8.755	11.265	7.176	7.421	4.621
		(57.704)	(10.110)	(9.863)	(22.855)	(15.580)	(17.988)	(6.244)
	Sample Mean	664.651	102.651	126.820	265.759	169.421	183.306	209.293
	Observations	90	90	90	90	90	90	90
Medium	Current year	-23.861	-0.643	-3.244	-9.288	-10.686**	-6.218	-3.823
		(16.618)	(2.658)	(3.984)	(7.241)	(4.712)	(4.680)	(4.198)
	Prior year	-6.780	1.698	-2.399	-2.058	-4.021	1.736	1.777
		(19.575)	(2.765)	(3.821)	(9.224)	(5.004)	(6.194)	(4.319)
	Combined	-30.641	1.055	-5.643	-11.346	-14.707*	-4.482	-2.046
		(25.672)	(3.578)	(5.062)	(11.419)	(7.530)	(5.759)	(5.735)
	Sample Mean	638.708	109.676	122.472	248.038	158.522	216.170	184.666
	Observations	90	90	90	90	90	90	90
Large	Current year	-14.915	-2.116	-2.741	-6.660	-3.399	0.956	0.251
		(13.613)	(1.269)	(3.005)	(6.666)	(3.379)	(6.246)	(4.197)
	Prior year	14.099	1.398	2.343	8.065	2.293	0.784	-2.774
		(11.876)	(1.105)	(2.534)	(5.796)	(3.410)	(7.682)	(2.869)
	Combined	-0.816	-0.718	-0.397	1.405	-1.105	1.740	-2.523
		(12.074)	(1.055)	(2.448)	(5.914)	(3.116)	(3.626)	(2.427)
	Sample Mean	664.996	101.156	120.493	271.411	171.935	200.194	233.716
	Observations	84	84	84	84	84	84	84

Notes: Each panel reports estimates from a separate regression for counties in that size tercile, based on the total 2013 revenue of the county's shelters and the shelter cutoffs in Table 12. Observations are county-years, 2014–2019. Current year and prior year report the coefficients on current-year and prior-year government grants ($100,000s, 2013 dollars). Combined is their sum, the effect on the current-year outcome when grants are $100,000 higher in both the current and prior year, with its standard error computed via a Wald test. Column definitions match Table 11. All regressions include county and year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered by county, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

7 Robustness

This section presents two checks on the main specification. First, I re-estimate the model after dropping each shelter individually to test whether a small number of influential shelters drive the results. The estimates change little across samples. Second, I restrict the sample to shelters with December fiscal year ends to test whether the results depend on the rule assigning Form 990 filings to grant years. The combined effects in this subsample are close to the full-sample estimates. The appendix reports additional checks of the finance and operations results: a specification with a second lag of grant funding (Appendix B.4), an assessment of sensitivity to selection on unobservables following Oster (2019) (Appendix B.5), staffing estimates for a balanced panel (Appendix C.2), and specifications with time-varying county controls and a pre-2020 sample (Appendix C.5). The finance and operations results are robust across all of these checks. For the violence and child maltreatment outcomes, Poisson estimates are consistent with the linear results (Appendix C.3).

Table 19 reports the main combined effect estimate for each financial and staffing outcome alongside the median, minimum, and maximum estimates across the 46 leave-one-out samples. For every outcome, the median estimate is close to the main estimate, and the range across samples is narrow. When grants are \$100,000 higher in both the current and prior year, the estimated increase in total revenue ranges from \$83,100 to \$93,000 across samples. The estimated change in private donations ranges from −\$17,700 to −\$7,700 and remains small relative to the grant increase in every sample. These estimates suggest that no single shelter drives the results.

Table 19: Robustness: Leave-One-Out Estimates

		Main	Median	Min	Max
Total Revenue	Current year	55,388***	55,166	50,309	67,814
	Prior year	31,351**	31,544	20,209	34,470
	Combined	86,740***	86,680	83,083	92,951
Total Expenditures	Current year	54,178***	54,105	49,604	57,795
	Prior year	19,137***	19,110	17,080	23,496
	Combined	73,315***	73,254	69,398	77,683
Compensation	Current year	31,096***	31,095	27,940	33,110
	Prior year	8,251*	8,236	6,629	10,687
	Combined	39,347***	39,318	34,914	42,556
Occupancy	Current year	−890	−903	−1,539	868
	Prior year	3,144**	3,147	2,058	3,656
	Combined	2,254*	2,242	1,697	2,926
Employee Count	Current year	0.488**	0.485	0.346	0.572
	Prior year	0.577***	0.576	0.470	0.707
	Combined	1.065***	1.065	0.966	1.137
Private Donations	Current year	−45,198***	−45,482	−49,482	−31,934
	Prior year	32,708**	32,939	20,672	36,727
	Combined	−12,490	−12,566	−17,721	−7,745

Notes: Main reports the full-sample estimate. Median, Min, and Max report the median, minimum, and maximum estimates across 46 samples, each dropping one shelter. Observations are shelter-years, 2014–2023. Dollar outcomes are in 2013 dollars per $100,000 in government grants. Current year and prior year report the coefficients on current-year and prior-year government grants. Combined is their sum, the effect on the current-year outcome when grants are $100,000 higher in both the current and prior year. All specifications include shelter and year fixed effects. Significance stars refer to the main estimate, with standard errors clustered by shelter. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 20 restricts the sample to the 25 shelters with December fiscal year ends, the most common fiscal year end in the sample. Because the assignment rule treats all of these shelters identically, differences in fiscal-year timing across shelters cannot drive the estimates. The combined effects in this subsample are close to the full-sample estimates. When grants are $100,000 higher in both the current and prior year, total revenue rises by $87,700, total

expenditures by $79,300, and compensation by $41,800, compared with $86,700, $73,300, and $39,300 in the full sample. Employee counts rise by 1.38, compared with 1.07 in the full sample. The combined effect on private donations is small and not statistically significant in both samples.

Restricting the sample to shelters with December fiscal-year ends produces similar combined effects, but changes how the response is distributed between the current and prior year. In this subsample, the prior-year coefficients for total revenue and private donations are much smaller than in the full sample, while the current-year revenue coefficient is larger. These differences are consistent with fiscal-year misalignment shifting part of the response into the prior-year coefficient in the full sample. The smaller prior-year coefficients do not reflect a loss of precision, as their standard errors are also smaller in the restricted sample.

Table 20: Robustness: December Fiscal Year Subsample

		Full Sample	December FY Only
Total Revenue	Current year	55,388***	81,002***
		(15,710)	(19,657)
	Prior year	31,351**	6,663
		(13,312)	(6,356)
	Combined	86,740***	87,665***
		(9,789)	(16,401)
Total Expenditures	Current year	54,178***	61,270***
		(7,647)	(10,912)
	Prior year	19,137***	18,079***
		(5,422)	(3,432)
	Combined	73,315***	79,349***
		(8,880)	(11,768)
Compensation	Current year	31,096***	34,852***
		(5,738)	(7,687)
	Prior year	8,251*	6,901
		(4,251)	(6,877)
	Combined	39,347***	41,753***
		(6,328)	(11,919)
Employee Count	Current year	0.488**	0.682**
		(0.202)	(0.310)
	Prior year	0.577***	0.703***
		(0.202)	(0.181)
	Combined	1.065***	1.385***
		(0.193)	(0.301)
Private Donations	Current year	−45,198***	−13,529
		(16,555)	(14,716)
	Prior year	32,708**	2,693
		(14,443)	(6,457)
	Combined	−12,490	−10,836
		(9,437)	(13,659)

Notes: The table compares estimates for the full sample (46 shelters) and for the 25 shelters with December fiscal year ends. Observations are shelter-years, 2014–2023. Dollar outcomes are in 2013 dollars per $100,000 in government grants. Current year and prior year report the coefficients on current-year and prior-year government grants. Combined is their sum, the effect on the current-year outcome when grants are $100,000 higher in both the current and prior year, with its standard error computed via a Wald test. All specifications include shelter and year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered by shelter, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

8 Conclusion

Policymakers allocating government funding to DV shelter programs have had little empirical evidence on how that funding affects shelter operations or victim outcomes. This paper provides the first such evidence, using a novel panel of DV shelters in Georgia linked to county-level hospital discharges, homicides, and child maltreatment reports.

A $100,000 increase in government grants sustained over the current and prior year raises shelter revenue by $86,700 and total expenditures by $73,300. Shelters direct much of this additional spending toward compensation and program services, and employee counts rise by roughly one employee. On average, I find little evidence that private donations decline, and the estimates rule out crowd-out larger than about 31 cents per grant dollar, in contrast to the substantial crowd-out documented elsewhere in the nonprofit literature. Donations decline at small shelters, with suggestive evidence of declines at large shelters, while medium shelters show the largest increases in revenue, spending, and staffing. The main estimates are similar across leave-one-out samples and among shelters with a December fiscal year. Together, these results show that additional government funding increases the resources available to DV shelters.

I find little evidence that increased shelter funding affects county-level measures of violence. Estimated effects on hospital discharges, homicides, and child maltreatment reports are imprecise. The estimates rule out reductions larger than 5.9 percent in hospital discharges and 5.3 percent in child maltreatment reports, but they cannot rule out smaller reductions that would still be meaningful. Homicide estimates are too imprecise to rule out moderate effects in either direction. Estimated effects vary by shelter size for some outcomes, but no consistent pattern emerges across outcomes. Thus, the results do not provide clear evidence that additional shelter funding changes measured violence or child maltreatment at the county level.

These aggregate outcomes, however, capture only some of the potential benefits of additional shelter resources. Funding may improve the intensity or quality of services available

to victims already connected to a shelter without producing detectable changes in county-level measures of violence. For example, more intensive safety planning, advocacy, or other services could improve victims' well-being without generating detectable changes in hospital discharges, homicides, or child maltreatment reports. Increased help-seeking and reporting could also lead to increases in observed violence, even if underlying violence declines. Evaluating these potential effects would require individual-level data linking victims to the services they receive and their subsequent outcomes, which are not currently available in a systematic administrative form.

DV shelters are the primary resource available to victims outside the criminal justice system, and government funding is a policy lever that states and the federal government can adjust directly. This paper shows that additional government funding increases shelter revenue, expenditures, and staffing without being offset, on average, by reductions in private support. Whether these additional resources ultimately improve outcomes for the victims shelters serve remains an important open question. Answering it will require new individual-level data, but the shelter-level data and evidence developed here provide a foundation for that future work.

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A Data and Measurement

In this appendix, I document how I build the DV Shelter Database and the measures used in the paper. I first list the terms used to identify DV service providers in Form 990 filings. I then describe the Form 990 entries and the revenue, expenditure, and staffing measures I construct from them. Finally, I report service provision for every CJCC service category.

A.1 DV-Related Search Terms

Table A.1 lists the terms I use to flag potential DV service providers in the first step of shelter identification. I derive the terms from Form 990 filings for shelters identified through an independent online search. The list covers the range of terms these organizations use to describe their DV programs. An organization is flagged if its mission or program statements include any of the terms.

Table A.1: Search Terms Used to Identify DV Shelters

domestic violence	intimate partner abuse
domestic abuse	battered women
intimate partner violence	domestic assault
family violence	family abuse
spousal abuse	spouse abuse
dating violence	DV
relationship violence	IPV

Notes: Terms are applied to the mission and program statements extracted from each organization's two most recent Form 990 filings.

A.2 Form 990 Variables

Table A.2 lists the Form 990 entries extracted for each shelter-year in the DV Shelter Database. Table A.3 describes the revenue, expenditure, and staffing measures I construct from these entries. Compensation, contract work, operations, occupancy, and other expenditures sum to total expenditures. Government grants, private donations, program service

revenue, and other revenue sum to total revenue. Primary program and fundraising expenditures classify spending by purpose, so they overlap with the expenditure categories.

Table A.2: Variables Extracted from Form 990 Filings

Variable	**Level**	**Form 990 Entry**
Organization name	Organization	Name of organization
Address	Organization	City or town, state or province, country, and ZIP
EIN	Organization	Employer Identification Number
Employee count	Organization	Total number of individuals employed in calendar year
Volunteer count	Organization	Total number of volunteers (estimate if necessary)
Mission statement	Organization	Briefly describe the organization's mission
Tax year start	Organization	Tax year beginning date
Tax year end	Organization	Tax year ending date
Total revenue	Organization	Total revenue
Total expenditures	Organization	Total expenses
Total compensation	Organization	Salaries, other compensation, employee benefits
Cash, beginning and end of year	Organization	Cash, non-interest-bearing
Program description‡	Program	Program service accomplishments for each of the three largest program services, as measured by expenses
Program expenditures‡	Program	Total expenses for each program service
Officers, directors, trustees, and key employees		
Employee name§	Organization	Name
Employee title§	Organization	Title
Employee compensation§	Organization	Reportable compensation from the organization
Statement of revenue		
Program service revenue	Organization	Program service revenue
Federated campaigns	Organization	Federated campaigns
Membership dues	Organization	Membership dues
Related organizations	Organization	Related organizations
Fundraising events	Organization	Fundraising events
Government grants	Organization	Government grants (contributions)
All other contributions	Organization	All other contributions, gifts, grants, and similar amounts not included above
Statement of functional expenses		
Fundraising expenditures	Organization	Total fundraising expenses
Occupancy	Organization	Occupancy, including rent, utilities, property insurance, real estate taxes, and mortgage interest
Legal fees	Organization	Fees for services (non-employees): legal
Accounting fees	Organization	Fees for services (non-employees): accounting
Management fees	Organization	Fees for services (non-employees): management
Lobbying fees	Organization	Fees for services (non-employees): lobbying
Professional fundraising fees	Organization	Fees for services (non-employees): professional fundraising services
Other fees for services	Organization	Fees for services (non-employees): other
Advertising	Organization	Advertising and promotion
Office expenses	Organization	Office expenses
Travel	Organization	Travel
Conferences	Organization	Conferences, conventions, and meetings
Employee benefits	Organization	Other employee benefits
Payroll taxes	Organization	Payroll taxes
Information technology	Organization	Information technology
Interest	Organization	Interest
Depreciation	Organization	Depreciation, depletion, and amortization

Notes: Organization-level variables are reported once per organization per year. ‡ Program-level variables are reported for up to three program services per organization per year, the organization's three largest by expense. § Reported for up to 17 officers, directors, trustees, or key employees per organization per year.

Table A.3: Constructed Revenue, Expenditure, and Staffing Measures

Measure	**Construction**
Revenue	
Private donations	All other contributions plus fundraising event revenue
Other revenue	Total revenue minus government grants, private donations, and program service revenue
Government grant share	Government grants divided by total revenue
Private donation share	Private donations divided by total revenue
Program revenue share	Program service revenue divided by total revenue
Other revenue share	Other revenue divided by total revenue
Expenditures	
Compensation	Officer and employee salaries, other compensation, employee benefits, pension contributions, and payroll taxes
Contract work	Sum of management, legal, accounting, lobbying, professional fundraising, and other fees for services
Operations	Sum of advertising, office, information technology, travel, and conference expenses
Other expenditures	Total expenditures minus compensation, contract work, operations, and occupancy expenditures
Primary program	Expenses for the largest program service reported on the Form 990
Fundraising	Total fundraising expenses
Cash and staffing	
Change in cash	End-of-year cash minus beginning-of-year cash
Compensation per employee	Compensation divided by employee count

Notes: Measures are constructed from the Form 990 entries in Table A.2. Compensation, contract work, operations, occupancy, and other expenditures sum to total expenditures. Primary program and fundraising expenditures classify spending by purpose and overlap with these categories. All dollar amounts are converted to 2013 dollars.

A.3 Service Provision for All Services

Table A.4 reports offering rates and the average number of victims receiving each service for all CJCC service categories. Panel A lists the fourteen services every shelter offers at some point, sorted by the share of shelters offering the service in all five years. Panel B lists all other services, sorted by the share of shelters offering the service in at least one year. Offering rates fall steadily across Panel B, from nearly all shelters for child care and information on the criminal justice process to fewer than one in five for forensic services and attorney-provided immigration assistance.

Table A.4: Georgia Shelter Service Provision for All Services, 2018–2022

Service	Shelter-Years Offered (%)	Ever Offered (%)	Always Offered (%)	Avg. Victims per Year
Panel A: Near-universal services (offered at some point by all 46 shelters)				
Crisis Line	99.1	100.0	95.7	2,017
Individual Support	99.1	100.0	95.7	7,599
Referral to Services, Support, Resources	99.1	100.0	95.7	1,107
Transportation Assistance	98.7	100.0	93.5	1,297
Safe Housing	97.8	100.0	91.3	3,684
Support Group	93.9	100.0	84.8	617
Interagency Advocacy	90.9	100.0	76.1	823
Non-Emergency Legal Assistance	92.2	100.0	73.9	523
Emergency Legal Assistance	90.4	100.0	73.9	801
Emergency Financial Assistance	91.3	100.0	69.6	178
Criminal Justice Support/Advocacy	90.4	100.0	69.6	327
Relocation Assistance	90.0	100.0	67.4	210
TANF/Government Benefits Assistance	87.4	100.0	63.0	110
Crisis Coordination	87.0	100.0	60.9	2,581
Panel B: All other services				
Child/Dependent Care Assistance	82.6	97.8	56.5	259
Information on Criminal Justice Process	72.2	97.8	41.3	170
Information Explaining Victim Rights	76.5	95.7	45.7	186
Assistance Applying for Victims Compensation	73.9	95.7	45.7	40
Access to Language Assistance	63.5	95.7	34.8	78
Non-Traditional Therapeutic Intervention	66.5	93.5	39.1	340
Therapy from Licensed Clinician/Counselor	65.7	93.5	39.1	200
Advocacy/Accompaniment–Emergency Medical	60.9	93.5	28.3	43
Civil Legal Attorney Assistance–TPO	65.2	87.0	30.4	96
Assistance Placing Animals in Distress	55.2	82.6	21.7	30
Law Enforcement Interview Advocacy	42.6	78.3	15.2	30
Transitional Housing	39.1	71.7	17.4	1,147
Civil Legal Attorney Assistance–Family Law	38.3	71.7	6.5	47
Immigration Assistance–Advocate	33.0	69.6	10.9	27
Victim Notification of Criminal Justice Events	33.5	67.4	8.7	46
Group Therapy	24.8	58.7	4.3	62
Victim Impact Assistance	16.5	47.8	2.2	22
On-Scene Crisis Response	15.7	34.8	2.2	4.9
Prosecution Interview Advocacy	13.9	32.6	2.2	12.4
Assistance with Restitution	7.8	28.3	0.0	0.8
Performance of Initial Forensic Medical Exam	13.0	19.6	8.7	9.4
Performance of Forensic Interview	13.9	17.4	8.7	8.8
Performance of Follow-Up Forensic Medical Exam	10.9	17.4	2.2	0.7
Immigration Assistance–Attorney	5.2	13.0	0.0	6.9

Notes: Sample includes the 46 shelters with CJCC service records, 2018–2022 ($N = 230$ shelter-years). "Shelter-Years Offered" is the share of shelter-years in which the shelter offers the service. "Ever Offered" is the share of shelters offering the service in at least one year. "Always Offered" is the share offering it in all five years. A shelter offers a service in a year if it reports at least one victim receiving that service. Avg. victims per year is the mean across shelter-years. The table excludes the catch-all category "Other Service Provided," which no shelter reports offering. Data come from CJCC.

B Evidence on the Identifying Assumptions

In this appendix, I provide additional evidence on the assumptions in Section 5.2. I first explain the choice of estimator. I then examine how CJCC allocates grants across shelters and over time and report event study estimates for every outcome. Finally, I assess the limited carryover assumption by adding a second lag of grant funding, and I assess how sensitive the financial and staffing estimates are to selection on unobservables.

B.1 Estimator Choice

Recent work shows that two-way fixed effects (TWFE) regressions can produce misleading estimates when treatment effects vary across units or over time, because some units implicitly serve as comparisons for others (Callaway et al., 2024; de Chaisemartin & D'Haultfœuille, 2020). Several estimators address this problem for continuous treatments, but the two most relevant do not fit this setting. The estimator in Callaway et al. (2024) requires a comparison group of untreated or not-yet-treated units. Nearly every shelter receives government grants in every year, so no such group exists. The estimator in de Chaisemartin et al. (2024) assumes that a unit's current treatment affects only its current outcome. Grants affect shelter outcomes in the following year, and funding is persistent across years, so this assumption is unlikely to hold. I therefore use TWFE with one lag of grant funding as the baseline specification.

B.2 Characterizing the Grant Allocation Process

I examine how CJCC allocated government grants across shelters and over time, as evidence for the discussion of parallel trends in Section 5.2. I document how persistent grant funding is, test whether pre-expansion funding predicts post-expansion funding growth, and test whether shelter and county characteristics predict grant changes.

B.2.1 Funding Persistence

I estimate the persistence of grant funding over 2014–2023 using

$$G_{it} = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \rho G_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{it}, \tag{3}$$

where G_{it} is government grant funding for shelter i in year t, and standard errors are clustered by county. The estimated persistence coefficient ρ is 0.671 ($p < 0.001$). A shelter's grant funding in one year therefore strongly predicts its funding in the following year, even after removing permanent differences across shelters and changes common to all shelters.

B.2.2 Pre-Expansion Funding and Post-Expansion Growth

If a shelter's funding before the 2015 expansion predicted its later funding growth, shelters with different pre-expansion funding would have followed different funding paths. I test this using

$$\Delta \bar{G}_i = c + \delta Z_i + e_i, \tag{4}$$

where $\Delta \bar{G}_i$ is shelter i's average annual grants over 2016–2019 minus its average annual grants over 2013–2015, and Z_i is a measure of pre-expansion funding. I also estimate a version in which the dependent variable is the change in grants from 2015 to 2016. In columns 1–3 of Table B.1, Z_i is a baseline funding level. In column 4, Z_i is each shelter's pre-expansion grant trend, the slope b_i from

$$G_{it} = a_i + b_i t + u_{it}, \qquad t \in \{2013, 2014, 2015\}. \tag{5}$$

None of the four coefficients is statistically significant. The coefficients on baseline funding range from 0.07 to 0.25, so grants rose by similar dollar amounts regardless of a shelter's baseline funding. The coefficient on the pre-expansion trend is 0.54 ($p = 0.157$). These tests use only 42 to 45 shelters and have limited power, so I interpret them as providing no

evidence of a relationship rather than as evidence that none exists.

Table B.1: Post-Expansion Grant Growth and Pre-Expansion Funding

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	2016 Grants minus 2015 Grants	Average 2016–2019 Grants minus Average 2013–2015 Grants		
Grant funding, 2013	0.065	0.136		
	(0.086)	(0.168)		
Average grant funding, 2013–2015			0.247	
			(0.209)	
Pre-expansion grant trend, $\hat{b}_i$				0.536
				(0.372)
Constant	38,558.4	147,888.0*	92,738.0	225,351.8***
	(38,634.1)	(82,864.4)	(98,487.8)	(35,796.5)
Shelters	42	44	45	45

Notes: Each column reports a regression of the dependent variable in the column header on the listed measure of pre-expansion funding. The pre-expansion grant trend $\hat{b}_i$ is each shelter's slope from Equation (5). Grants are in 2013 dollars. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

B.2.3 Predictors of Grant Changes

If CJCC adjusted funding in response to conditions correlated with the outcomes I study, grant changes would be endogenous to those outcomes. Because the main specification includes shelter fixed effects, changes in grants are the variation that identifies the main estimates, so I focus on predicting grant changes rather than levels.[17]

I first test whether lagged shelter and county characteristics predict grant changes using

$$\Delta G_{it} = \gamma_t + X'_{i,t-1}\beta + \varepsilon_{it}, \tag{6}$$

where $X_{i,t-1}$ includes lagged shelter finances, the lagged IPV homicide rate, and lagged county demographics. Column 6 of Table B.2 reports the estimates. No individual predictor is significant at the 5 percent level. The predictors are jointly significant ($F = 18.26$), but with 13 predictors and 44 county clusters, cluster-robust joint tests tend to over-reject, so I interpret this joint test cautiously.

[17]Lagged shelter finances strongly predict grant levels (within R^2 of 0.58), as expected, because grants are part of revenue and are persistent. Columns 1–5 of Table B.2 report these specifications.

Table B.2: Lagged Predictors of Government Grant Funding

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Dependent variable: Grant funding					Change in grant funding
Predictors:	Finance	Staffing	Violence	Demographics	All	All
Finance						
Grant funding					0.108	
					(0.255)	
Total revenue	0.973				−0.771	−0.349
	(0.588)				(1.639)	(1.834)
Total expenditures	−0.404				1.302	0.212
	(0.612)				(1.600)	(1.876)
Compensation	0.281				0.270	0.271*
	(0.184)				(0.167)	(0.156)
Private donations	−0.171**				−0.058	0.131
	(0.069)				(0.186)	(0.110)
Program revenue	0.177				−0.406	0.028
	(0.230)				(0.276)	(0.172)
Operating margin	−0.685				0.888	0.165
	(0.571)				(1.544)	(1.821)
Grant share of revenue	341,763.6***				201,973.4	−100,408.0
	(64,935.3)				(241,472.4)	(94,040.0)
Staffing						
Employee count		13,195.4***				
		(3,861.4)				
Volunteer count		−421.6				
		(326.9)				
Violence						
IPV homicide rate			355.5		−8,750.5	−8,541.1
			(7,458.5)		(5,386.0)	(5,359.5)
Demographics						
County births				−590.3***	−238.1**	−1.2
				(167.0)	(92.7)	(6.3)
Per capita income				35.7	21.6**	2.8
				(26.3)	(10.4)	(2.1)
Median household income				−5.9	1.2	−2.2
				(9.0)	(7.1)	(1.8)
Poverty rate				502.1	10,055.3	−1,170.1
				(9,956.9)	(6,243.9)	(2,725.0)
Unemployment rate				−12,527.3	−10,820.3	12,020.4
				(30,274.1)	(18,529.1)	(12,827.6)
Joint test (F)	79.56***	5.85***	0.00	4.38***	164.78***	18.26***
Within R^2	0.576	0.128	0.000	0.115	0.597	0.142
N	442	271	423	312	306	306

Notes: The dependent variable is government grant funding (2013 dollars) in columns 1–5 and the annual change in grant funding in column 6. Column headings name the set of predictors included. All predictors are lagged one year. Demographic predictors are measured at the county level. Columns 1–5 include shelter and year fixed effects, and column 6 includes year fixed effects. The joint test is an F-test that all listed coefficients equal zero. Standard errors, clustered by county, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

I then test whether grant changes respond to prior changes in the outcomes studied in Section 6. For each of 12 outcomes covering shelter finances, staffing, county violence, and child maltreatment, I estimate

$$\Delta G_{it} = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \beta \Delta Y_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{it}. \tag{7}$$

A positive β would be consistent with CJCC increasing funding when conditions worsen. Table B.3 reports the estimates. Prior-year increases in the IPV homicide rate and the female homicide rate predict smaller grant changes ($p = 0.031$ and $p = 0.016$), the opposite of what a needs-based allocation process would predict. Neither remains significant after a Benjamini-Hochberg correction across the 12 tests (adjusted $p = 0.19$ for both). No other prior outcome change predicts grant changes.

Table B.3: Prior Changes in Outcomes and the Next Grant Change

Prior change in:	Coefficient	SE	p	p (Bonferroni)	p (BH)
Total revenue	−0.027	(0.029)	0.349	1.000	0.535
Total expenditures	0.073	(0.078)	0.357	1.000	0.535
Compensation	0.269	(0.139)	0.060	0.720	0.225
Employee count	737.8	(1,231.9)	0.552	1.000	0.602
Private donations	0.031	(0.040)	0.446	1.000	0.595
IPV hospital discharges	1,371.9	(1,362.5)	0.320	1.000	0.535
DV hospital discharges	25.6	(745.7)	0.973	1.000	0.973
Female assault discharges	−77.3	(42.3)	0.075	0.900	0.225
IPV homicide rate	−8,545.8	(3,839.3)	0.031	0.372	0.186
DV homicide rate	−3,236.9	(3,365.7)	0.342	1.000	0.535
Female homicide rate	−1,518.4	(605.1)	0.016	0.192	0.186
Substantiated maltreatment reports	−31.6	(52.7)	0.551	1.000	0.602

Notes: The dependent variable is the annual change in grant funding (2013 dollars). Each row is a separate regression of the grant change on the prior-year change in the listed outcome, with shelter and year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered by county, in parentheses. p (Bonferroni) and p (BH) report Bonferroni-corrected (Dunn, 1961) and Benjamini-Hochberg-adjusted (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) p-values across the 12 tests.

B.3 Full Event Study Results


This section reports event study estimates from Equation (2) for every outcome in the main text. Each panel plots the coefficient and 95 percent confidence interval on the interaction between the 2015–2016 change in grants and year indicators, with 2015 as the omitted year. Shelter outcomes cover 2013–2023, and county outcomes cover 2013–2019.

B.3.1 Revenue


Figures B.1 and B.2 report event study estimates for the revenue outcomes in Table 6.

Figure B.1: Event Study Estimates: Revenue Outcomes (1 of 2)


(a) Total Revenue ($100,000s)



(b) Private Donations ($100,000s)



(c) Program Service Revenue ($100,000s)




(d) Other Revenue ($100,000s)



Notes: Each panel plots the coefficients β_k and 95 percent confidence intervals from Equation (2), with 2015 as the omitted year. Observations are shelter-years, 2013–2023. Standard errors are clustered by shelter.

Figure B.2: Event Study Estimates: Revenue Outcomes (2 of 2)


(a) Government Grant Share of Revenue



(b) Private Donation Share of Revenue



(c) Program Service Revenue Share of Revenue



(d) Other Revenue Share of Revenue




Notes: Each panel plots the coefficients β_k and 95 percent confidence intervals from Equation (2), with 2015 as the omitted year. Observations are shelter-years, 2013–2023. Standard errors are clustered by shelter.

B.3.2 Expenditures


Figure B.3 reports event study estimates for the expenditure outcomes in Table 7.

Figure B.3: Event Study Estimates: Expenditure Outcomes


(a) Total Expenditures ($100,000s)




(b) Primary Program ($100,000s)




(c) Compensation ($100,000s)



(d) Contract Work ($100,000s)



(e) Operations ($100,000s)



(f) Occupancy ($100,000s)



(g) Fundraising ($100,000s)



(h) Other Expenditures ($100,000s)




Notes: Each panel plots the coefficients β_k and 95 percent confidence intervals from Equation (2), with 2015 as the omitted year. Observations are shelter-years, 2013–2023. Standard errors are clustered by shelter.

B.3.3 Staffing


Figure B.4 reports event study estimates for the staffing outcomes in Table 8.

Figure B.4: Event Study Estimates: Staffing Outcomes

(a) Employee Count



(b) Volunteer Count



Notes: Each panel plots the coefficients β_k and 95 percent confidence intervals from Equation (2), with 2015 as the omitted year. Observations are shelter-years, 2013–2023. Standard errors are clustered by shelter.

B.3.4 Hospital Discharges


Figure B.5 reports event study estimates for the hospital discharge outcomes in Table 9.

Figure B.5: Event Study Estimates: Hospital Discharges


(a) IPV Discharges (per 100,000 residents)



(b) DV Discharges (per 100,000 residents)



(c) Female Assault Discharges (per 100,000 women ages 18–34)




Notes: Each panel plots the coefficients β_k and 95 percent confidence intervals from Equation (2), with 2015 as the omitted year and ΔGrants_i measured as the change in total grants across the county's shelters. Observations are county-years, 2013–2019. Standard errors are clustered by county.

B.3.5 Homicides


Figure B.6 reports event study estimates for the homicide outcomes in Table 10.

Figure B.6: Event Study Estimates: Homicides


(a) IPV Homicides (per 100,000 residents)



(b) DV Homicides (per 100,000 residents)



(c) Female Homicides (per 100,000 women ages 18–34)



(d) Child Homicides (per 100,000 residents under 18)




Notes: Each panel plots the coefficients β_k and 95 percent confidence intervals from Equation (2), with 2015 as the omitted year and ΔGrants_i measured as the change in total grants across the county's shelters. Observations are county-years, 2013–2019. Standard errors are clustered by county.

B.3.6 Child Maltreatment Reports Rates (Per 100,000 Population Under 18)


Figure B.7 reports event study estimates for the child maltreatment outcomes in Table 11.

Figure B.7: Event Study Estimates: Child Maltreatment Reports


(a) Substantiated Reports, All Ages




(b) Substantiated Reports, Infants




(c) Substantiated Reports, Ages 1–3




(d) Substantiated Reports, Ages 4–10




(e) Substantiated Reports, Ages 11–17



(f) Reports with DV Present in Home



(g) Reports with Foster Care Placement



Notes: Each panel plots the coefficients β_k and 95 percent confidence intervals from Equation (2), with 2015 as the omitted year and ΔGrants_i measured as the change in total grants across the county's shelters. Observations are county-years, 2013–2019. Standard errors are clustered by county. All outcomes are per 100,000 county population under 18.

B.4 Specification with a Second Lag of Grant Funding

The main specification includes current-year and prior-year grants, which assumes that a grant affects outcomes only in the year it is received and the following year. To assess this assumption, I add a second lag of grant funding:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_1 \cdot \text{Grants}_{it} + \beta_2 \cdot \text{Grants}_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \cdot \text{Grants}_{i,t-2} + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{it}, \tag{8}$$

where grants are measured in \$100,000s of 2013 dollars and all other terms follow Equation (1). The combined effect $\beta_1 + \beta_2 + \beta_3$ is the effect on the current-year outcome when grants are \$100,000 higher in the current year and each of the two prior years. Because the second lag requires grant data from two years earlier, the estimation sample begins in 2015.

Tables B.4 and B.5 report the estimates. The combined effects are close to the baseline estimates. Total revenue rises by \$96,600 and total expenditures by \$68,300, compared with \$86,700 and \$73,300 in the baseline specification (Tables 6 and 7). The combined effect on private donations is \$700 and not statistically significant, compared with −\$12,500 in the baseline. The second-lag coefficient is positive and statistically significant for total revenue, private donations, total expenditures, and primary program spending, and negative and significant for other revenue and fundraising expenses. For compensation, the second-lag coefficient is small and not statistically significant. Adding the second lag therefore shifts the timing of some responses but does not qualitatively change the combined effects that the main specification reports.

Table B.4: Effects of Government Grants on DV Shelter Revenue, with a Second Lag

	(1) Total Revenue	(2) Private Donations	(3) Program Service Revenue	(4) Other Revenue
			($100,000s)	
Government Grants, Current Year ($100,000s)	0.678***	-0.317**	0.008	-0.013
	(0.119)	(0.123)	(0.017)	(0.044)
Government Grants, Prior Year ($100,000s)	0.093	0.043	0.014	0.036
	(0.080)	(0.077)	(0.012)	(0.036)
Government Grants, Two Years Prior ($100,000s)	0.196**	0.281***	0.004	-0.089***
	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.013)	(0.027)
Combined Effect (Current + Two Prior Years)	0.966***	0.007	0.026	-0.066
	(0.099)	(0.087)	(0.030)	(0.046)
Observations	391	391	391	391

Notes: Observations are shelter-years, 2015–2023. All regressions follow Equation (8) and include shelter and year fixed effects. The combined effect is the sum of the three grant coefficients, the effect on the current-year outcome when government grants are $100,000 higher in the current year and each of the two prior years. Its standard error is computed via a Wald test that accounts for the covariances among the coefficients. Dollar amounts are in 2013 dollars. Column definitions match Table 6. Standard errors, clustered by shelter, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B.5: Effects of Government Grants on DV Shelter Expenditures, with a Second Lag

		By Purpose		By Type				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Total Expenditures	Primary Program	Fundraising	Compensation	Contract Work	Operations	Occupancy	Other
	($100,000s)							
Government Grants, Current Year ($100,000s)	0.436***	0.433***	0.033	0.233***	0.047*	0.036	-0.007	0.127**
	(0.080)	(0.059)	(0.033)	(0.045)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.048)
Government Grants, Prior Year ($100,000s)	0.150***	0.117*	0.027	0.094**	0.006	-0.007	0.024	0.034
	(0.041)	(0.067)	(0.017)	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.045)
Government Grants, Two Years Prior ($100,000s)	0.096***	0.128***	-0.025**	0.014	0.037	-0.006	0.011	0.041
	(0.029)	(0.043)	(0.012)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.052)
Combined Effect (Current + Two Prior Years)	0.683***	0.677***	0.035	0.341***	0.089	0.022	0.028**	0.203**
	(0.095)	(0.075)	(0.045)	(0.069)	(0.056)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.078)
Observations	391	391	391	391	391	391	391	391

Notes: Observations are shelter-years, 2015–2023. All regressions follow Equation (8) and include shelter and year fixed effects. The combined effect is the sum of the three grant coefficients, the effect on the current-year outcome when government grants are $100,000 higher in the current year and each of the two prior years. Its standard error is computed via a Wald test that accounts for the covariances among the coefficients. Dollar amounts are in 2013 dollars. Column definitions match Table 7. Primary program expenditure (column 2) and fundraising expenses (column 3) classify spending by purpose and overlap with the expense categories in columns 4–8. Standard errors, clustered by shelter, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

B.5 Sensitivity to Selection on Unobservables

The main specification identifies the effects of grants from within-shelter changes in funding, after removing permanent differences across shelters with shelter fixed effects. A remaining concern is that time-varying factors that the fixed effects do not absorb could also be correlated with grant changes. Following Oster (2019), I use the change in the combined effect and in the R^2 when shelter fixed effects are added to assess how large such unobserved factors would need to be to explain away the estimates.

For each outcome, I compare a specification with year fixed effects only to the main specification with year and shelter fixed effects. I then compute two quantities. The first is a bias-adjusted combined effect, which assumes that unobserved factors are as important as the shelter fixed effects in explaining grant variation ($\delta = 1$). The second is the value of δ at which the bias-adjusted combined effect would equal zero. Both calculations set the

maximum attainable R^2 ($R_{\max}$) to $\min(1.3\tilde{R}, 1)$, where $\tilde{R}$ is the R^2 of the main specification (Oster, 2019). Because $\tilde{R}$ exceeds 0.77 for every outcome, $R_{\max}$ equals or nearly equals 1, the most conservative possible value.

Table B.6 reports the results. For total revenue, total expenditures, compensation, and employee counts, the bias-adjusted combined effects remain positive and economically meaningful. Unobserved factors would need to be between 2.3 and 5.1 times as important as permanent shelter differences to reduce these effects to zero. These results suggest that the main financial and staffing estimates are unlikely to be explained by selection on unobserved shelter characteristics.

Table B.6: Sensitivity of Combined Effects to Selection on Unobservables

	Year FE Only		Year and Shelter FE		Bias-Adjusted	δ for
	Combined Effect	R^2	Combined Effect	R^2	Effect ($\delta = 1$)	Effect = 0
Total revenue ($100,000s)	1.429	0.852	0.867	0.941	0.492	2.31
Total expenditures ($100,000s)	1.359	0.872	0.733	0.976	0.591	5.14
Compensation ($100,000s)	0.725	0.825	0.393	0.946	0.245	2.65
Employee count	1.839	0.407	1.065	0.856	0.818	4.30

Notes: Combined effects are $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ from Equation (1), the effect on the current-year outcome when government grants are $100,000 higher (2013 dollars) in both the current and prior year. Columns 1–2 include year fixed effects only; columns 3–4 add shelter fixed effects and reproduce the main estimates. The bias-adjusted effect and δ follow Oster (2019), with $R_{\max} = \min(1.3\tilde{R}, 1)$. A negative δ indicates that adding controls moves the estimate away from zero. Observations are shelter-years, 2014–2023; the employee count regressions use 440 observations and all others use 442.

C Additional Results and Robustness

This appendix reports additional results and robustness checks. I examine shelters' cash holdings, re-estimate the staffing results on a balanced panel, report Poisson estimates for the violence and child maltreatment outcomes, test whether effects differ across shelter size terciles, and report specifications with time-varying county controls and a pre-2020 sample.

C.1 Cash Holdings

Shelters spend 85 percent of the additional revenue from government grants. To examine where the remaining revenue goes, I estimate Equation (1) with two measures of cash holdings from Form 990 as outcomes. The first is the annual change in cash, measured as end-of-year minus beginning-of-year cash. The second is end-of-year cash.

Table C.1 reports the estimates. When grants are $100,000 higher in both the current and prior year, the annual change in cash rises by $15,400. This is close to the $13,400 difference between the revenue and expenditure effects, so shelters appear to hold most of the unspent revenue as cash. The combined effect on end-of-year cash is $12,600 and not statistically significant. End-of-year cash reflects surpluses accumulated over a shelter's full funding history, so it depends on grants in all prior years, not only the current and prior year. The annual change in cash is therefore the more relevant measure.

Table C.1: Effects of Government Grants on DV Shelter Cash Holdings

	(1) Annual Change in Cash	(2) End-of-Year Cash
	($100,000s)	
Government Grants, Current Year ($100,000s)	0.049	-0.055
	(0.076)	(0.097)
Government Grants, Prior Year ($100,000s)	0.105	0.181*
	(0.112)	(0.106)
Combined Effect (Current + Prior Year)	0.154***	0.126
	(0.052)	(0.093)
Sample Mean	0.271	2.552
Observations	442	442

Notes: Observations are shelter-years, 2014–2023. All regressions include shelter and year fixed effects. The combined effect is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$, the effect on the current-year outcome when government grants are $100,000 higher in both the current and prior year. Its standard error is computed via a Wald test that accounts for the covariance between β_1 and β_2. Dollar amounts are in 2013 dollars. Column 1 is end-of-year minus beginning-of-year cash reported on Form 990, and column 2 is end-of-year cash. Standard errors, clustered by shelter, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.2 Staffing Estimates for a Balanced Panel

The main staffing estimates use every shelter-year with a reported employee count, which produces an unbalanced panel. To check that the results do not reflect shelters entering or leaving the sample, I re-estimate the staffing specifications for the 37 shelters that report employee counts in every year. Table C.2 reports the estimates. The combined effect on employee counts is 1.09, compared with 1.07 in the main specification. The combined effects on compensation per employee and volunteer counts are not statistically significant.

Table C.2: Effects of Government Grants on DV Shelter Staffing, Balanced Panel

	(1) Compensation ($100,000s)	(2) Contract Work ($100,000s)	(3) Employee Count	(4) Volunteer Count	(5) Compensation per Employee ($100,000s)
Government Grants, Current Year ($100,000s)	0.287***	0.030*	0.486*	-2.631**	0.007**
	(0.062)	(0.018)	(0.258)	(1.115)	(0.003)
Government Grants, Prior Year ($100,000s)	0.088*	0.051	0.601**	1.345	-0.004
	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.231)	(2.144)	(0.003)
Combined Effect (Current + Prior Year)	0.375***	0.081	1.088***	-1.285	0.003
	(0.081)	(0.057)	(0.239)	(2.620)	(0.002)
Sample Mean	6.008	0.468	27.24	60.47	0.219
Observations	370	370	370	207	370

Notes: Observations are shelter-years, 2014–2023, for the 37 shelters that report employee counts in every year. Column 4 uses the years in which these shelters also report volunteer counts. All regressions include shelter and year fixed effects. The combined effect is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$, the effect on the current-year outcome when government grants are $100,000 higher in both the current and prior year. Its standard error is computed via a Wald test that accounts for the covariance between β_1 and β_2. Dollar amounts are in 2013 dollars. Column definitions match Table 8. Standard errors, clustered by shelter, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.3 Poisson Estimates for Violence and Child Maltreatment

Several violence outcomes are rare at the county level, and homicide rates are zero in many county-years. As an alternative to the linear specification, I estimate Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood models of the same per-capita rates used in the main specification:

$$E[Y_{it} \mid G_{it}, G_{i,t-1}] = \exp\left(\alpha_i + \gamma_t + \beta_1 G_{it} + \beta_2 G_{i,t-1}\right). \tag{9}$$

Each coefficient is approximately the proportional change in the outcome for each $100,000 in government grants. Counties in which an outcome is zero in every year provide no information in a fixed-effects Poisson model, so they drop out of the estimation sample.

Tables C.3 to C.5 report the estimates. The Poisson estimates are consistent with the linear results. For female assault discharges, the combined effect implies a 1.4 percent increase, close to the linear estimate of 1.5 percent of the sample mean. This estimate is

significant at the 5 percent level but does not survive the Benjamini-Hochberg correction across the three hospital discharge outcomes. For reports with DV present in the home, the combined effect implies a 2.6 percent increase, significant only at the 10 percent level. No other combined effect is statistically significant.

Table C.3: Poisson Estimates: Hospital Discharges

	(1) IPV Discharges	(2) DV Discharges	(3) Female Assault Discharges, Ages 18–34
Government Grants, Current Year ($100,000s)	0.003	0.013	-0.006
	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.006)
Government Grants, Prior Year ($100,000s)	-0.016	-0.005	0.020***
	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.007)
Combined Effect (Current + Prior Year)	-0.013	0.008	0.014**
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.007)
Observations	264	264	264

Notes: Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimates of Equation (9). Observations are county-years for counties in the analysis sample, 2014–2019. Counties in which the outcome is zero in every year drop out of the estimation sample. All regressions include county and year fixed effects. Coefficients are approximately the proportional change in the outcome per $100,000 in government grants (2013 dollars). The combined effect is $\beta_1+\beta_2$, with its standard error computed via a Wald test that accounts for the covariance between β_1 and β_2. Column definitions match Table 9. Standard errors, clustered by county, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.4: Poisson Estimates: Homicides

	(1) IPV Homicides	(2) DV Homicides	(3) Female Homicides, Ages 18–34	(4) Child Homicides
Government Grants, Current Year ($100,000s)	-0.083**	0.003	-0.033	-0.032
	(0.041)	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.032)
Government Grants, Prior Year ($100,000s)	0.144**	0.050	-0.063	0.017
	(0.061)	(0.054)	(0.071)	(0.047)
Combined Effect (Current + Prior Year)	0.061	0.053	-0.095	-0.015
	(0.052)	(0.039)	(0.074)	(0.047)
Observations	228	246	174	162

Notes: Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimates of Equation (9). Observations are county-years for counties in the analysis sample, 2014–2019. Counties in which the outcome is zero in every year drop out of the estimation sample. All regressions include county and year fixed effects. Coefficients are approximately the proportional change in the outcome per $100,000 in government grants (2013 dollars). The combined effect is $\beta_1+\beta_2$, with its standard error computed via a Wald test that accounts for the covariance between β_1 and β_2. Column definitions match Table 10. Standard errors, clustered by county, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.5: Poisson Estimates: Child Maltreatment Reports

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Substantiated Reports					DV Present	Foster Care
	All Ages	Infants	Ages 1–3	Ages 4–10	Ages 11–17	in Home	Placement
Government Grants, Current Year ($100,000s)	-0.005	-0.004	-0.005	-0.004	-0.013	0.005	0.002
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Government Grants, Prior Year ($100,000s)	0.003	0.007	0.004	0.004	-0.005	0.021	0.005
	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.012)
Combined Effect (Current + Prior Year)	-0.003	0.004	-0.001	0.000	-0.018	0.026*	0.007
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Observations	228	228	228	228	228	228	228

Notes: Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimates of Equation (9). Observations are county-years for counties in the analysis sample, 2014–2019. Counties in which the outcome is zero in every year drop out of the estimation sample. All regressions include county and year fixed effects. Coefficients are approximately the proportional change in the outcome per $100,000 in government grants (2013 dollars). The combined effect is $\beta_1+\beta_2$, with its standard error computed via a Wald test that accounts for the covariance between β_1 and β_2. Column definitions match Table 11. Standard errors, clustered by county, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.4 Differences in Effects by Shelter Size

The heterogeneity analysis estimates Equation (1) separately for small, medium, and large shelters. Because the tercile regressions use non-overlapping sets of shelters and counties, the tercile-specific combined effects are independent. I test whether the combined effects differ between each pair of terciles a and b using

$$z = \frac{\hat{\theta}_a - \hat{\theta}_b}{\sqrt{\widehat{se}_a^{\,2} + \widehat{se}_b^{\,2}}}, \tag{10}$$

where $\hat{\theta}_a$ is the combined effect for tercile a and $\widehat{se}_a$ is its standard error. Table C.6 reports the combined effects and pairwise p-values for shelter outcomes, and Table C.7 reports them for county outcomes.

DeKalb County is the only county with more than one shelter in the analysis sample. Its county-level grant measure sums grants across its three shelters, and their combined 2013 revenue places it in the large tercile. Because DeKalb's grant measure combines funding changes at several organizations, it may differ from the grant measure in single-shelter counties and could have outsized influence on the large-tercile estimates. The last three columns of Table C.7 re-estimate the large-tercile county regressions without DeKalb County. Excluding DeKalb County reduces the precision of the large-tercile estimates but does not change which large-tercile combined effects are statistically significant.

Table C.6: Combined Effects by Shelter Size and Pairwise Tests: Shelter Outcomes

	Combined Effect			Pairwise p-value		
	Small	Medium	Large	Small vs. Medium	Small vs. Large	Medium vs. Large
Total revenue	0.506**	1.051***	0.778***	0.007	0.224	0.049
	(0.190)	(0.073)	(0.118)			
Private donations	-0.351***	-0.020	-0.223*	0.010	0.431	0.167
	(0.105)	(0.075)	(0.126)			
Program service revenue	0.017	0.020	0.028	0.919	0.780	0.890
	(0.012)	(0.037)	(0.039)			
Other revenue	-0.159*	0.051*	-0.027	0.016	0.154	0.121
	(0.082)	(0.028)	(0.042)			
Government grant share	0.084***	0.017**	0.025***	0.009	0.021	0.384
	(0.024)	(0.006)	(0.007)			
Private donation share	-0.052*	-0.020**	-0.022***	0.217	0.250	0.793
	(0.025)	(0.007)	(0.006)			
Program revenue share	0.002	0.002	-0.001	0.901	0.195	0.537
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)			
Other revenue share	-0.034***	0.001	-0.002	0.001	0.003	0.576
	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.004)			
Total expenditures	0.449*	1.062***	0.631***	0.007	0.467	0.001
	(0.219)	(0.060)	(0.122)			
Primary program	0.456***	0.931***	0.582***	0.000	0.367	0.016
	(0.091)	(0.098)	(0.107)			
Fundraising	0.002	0.004	0.058	0.801	0.266	0.285
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.050)			
Compensation	0.278*	0.617***	0.319***	0.034	0.803	0.003
	(0.144)	(0.069)	(0.074)			
Contract work	0.010**	-0.009	0.130	0.131	0.121	0.074
	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.077)			
Operations	0.018**	0.066***	0.007	0.001	0.672	0.033
	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.024)			
Occupancy	0.034**	0.072**	0.006	0.233	0.224	0.042
	(0.016)	(0.028)	(0.017)			
Other expenditures	0.109	0.316***	0.170	0.075	0.637	0.293
	(0.074)	(0.090)	(0.106)			
Employee count	0.857**	1.820***	0.844**	0.006	0.976	0.008
	(0.300)	(0.182)	(0.319)			
Volunteer count	-0.744	-2.466	-8.607	0.802	0.107	0.457
	(1.146)	(6.754)	(4.741)			
Compensation per employee	0.006	0.007*	0.003	0.969	0.675	0.349
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.002)			

Notes: Observations are shelter-years, 2014–2023. Each combined effect is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ from Equation (1), estimated separately for each size tercile, defined by 2013 total revenue. All regressions include shelter and year fixed effects. Dollar outcomes are in $100,000s of 2013 dollars. Pairwise p-values are from two-sided z-tests of the difference between tercile-specific combined effects (Equation (10)). Standard errors, clustered by shelter, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.7: Combined Effects by Shelter Size and Pairwise Tests: County Outcomes

	Combined Effect			Pairwise p-value			Excluding DeKalb County		
	Small	Medium	Large	Small vs. Medium	Small vs. Large	Medium vs. Large	Large	Small vs. Large	Medium vs. Large
IPV discharges	-0.236	-0.269	0.087	0.954	0.486	0.360	0.377	0.215	0.129
	(0.433)	(0.351)	(0.166)				(0.241)		
DV discharges	-0.114	-0.050	0.130	0.967	0.765	0.894	0.346	0.633	0.784
	(0.774)	(1.324)	(0.263)				(0.576)		
Female assault discharges	18.162	31.692**	1.110	0.466	0.162	0.042	-4.929	0.077	0.020
	(11.587)	(14.524)	(3.839)				(5.977)		
IPV homicides	0.207	-0.012	0.013	0.100	0.109	0.671	-0.009	0.078	0.973
	(0.120)	(0.056)	(0.014)				(0.026)		
DV homicides	0.229	-0.003	0.015	0.118	0.110	0.803	0.001	0.119	0.966
	(0.132)	(0.066)	(0.023)				(0.062)		
Female homicides	-2.008*	-0.114	0.171**	0.057	0.026	0.193	0.217*	0.023	0.169
	(0.973)	(0.208)	(0.068)				(0.120)		
Child homicides	-0.072	0.079	-0.077	0.624	0.980	0.603	0.156	0.448	0.835
	(0.152)	(0.267)	(0.137)				(0.259)		
Substantiated, all ages	22.773	-30.641	-0.816	0.398	0.689	0.293	-14.443	0.550	0.640
	(57.704)	(25.672)	(12.074)				(23.291)		
Substantiated, infants	-4.424	1.055	-0.718	0.609	0.715	0.635	-2.517	0.852	0.356
	(10.110)	(3.578)	(1.055)				(1.465)		
Substantiated, ages 1–3	8.755	-5.643	-0.397	0.194	0.368	0.351	-2.714	0.293	0.671
	(9.863)	(5.062)	(2.448)				(4.674)		
Substantiated, ages 4–10	11.265	-11.346	1.405	0.376	0.676	0.321	-5.279	0.522	0.714
	(22.855)	(11.419)	(5.914)				(11.997)		
Substantiated, ages 11–17	7.176	-14.707*	-1.105	0.206	0.602	0.095	-3.933	0.508	0.269
	(15.580)	(7.530)	(3.116)				(6.196)		
DV present in home	7.421	-4.482	1.740	0.529	0.757	0.361	-0.092	0.704	0.660
	(17.988)	(5.759)	(3.626)				(8.135)		
Foster care placement	4.621	-2.046	-2.523	0.432	0.286	0.939	-1.932	0.422	0.988
	(6.244)	(5.735)	(2.427)				(5.245)		

Notes: Observations are county-years, 2014–2019. Each combined effect is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ from Equation (1), estimated separately for counties in each size tercile, based on the total 2013 revenue of the county's shelters and the shelter cutoffs in Table 12. All regressions include county and year fixed effects. Pairwise p-values are from two-sided z-tests of the difference between tercile-specific combined effects (Equation (10)). The last three columns re-estimate the large-tercile regressions excluding DeKalb County and compare the result with the small and medium terciles. Standard errors, clustered by county, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.5 Additional Robustness Checks

I report two additional checks on the financial and staffing results. The first adds time-varying county median household income, poverty rate, and unemployment rate to Equation (1). If CJCC allocated grants in response to changing local economic conditions that also affect shelter finances, adding these controls would change the estimates. The second restricts the sample to 2014–2019, before the COVID-19 pandemic and the decline in CVF distributions. Table C.8 reports the combined effects.

Adding county controls leaves the estimates nearly unchanged. The combined effect on total revenue is $86,300, compared with $86,700 in the main specification. Restricting the sample to 2014–2019 produces similar estimates for total revenue, primary program spending, and employee counts. The combined effects on total expenditures and compensation are larger in the pre-2020 sample, at $87,400 and $56,000, compared with $73,300 and $39,300 in the main specification. The combined effect on private donations is −$22,500, significant only at the 10 percent level. Its 95 percent confidence interval rules out declines larger than 48 cents per grant dollar.

Table C.8: Additional Robustness Checks: Combined Effects

	(1) Main Specification	(2) County Controls	(3) 2014–2019 Only
Total revenue	0.867***	0.863***	0.822***
	(0.098)	(0.096)	(0.152)
Private donations	-0.125	-0.129	-0.225*
	(0.094)	(0.096)	(0.130)
Government grant share	0.028***	0.029***	0.022***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Private donation share	-0.021***	-0.022***	-0.023***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Total expenditures	0.733***	0.731***	0.874***
	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.127)
Primary program	0.675***	0.669***	0.689***
	(0.072)	(0.066)	(0.097)
Compensation	0.393***	0.395***	0.560***
	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.135)
Employee count	1.065***	1.087***	0.978***
	(0.193)	(0.185)	(0.233)
Observations	442	442	262

Notes: Observations are shelter-years. The employee count regressions in columns 1 and 2 use 440 observations. Each cell reports the combined effect $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ from Equation (1), the effect on the current-year outcome when government grants are \$100,000 higher in both the current and prior year. All regressions include shelter and year fixed effects. Dollar outcomes are in \$100,000s of 2013 dollars. Column 1 reproduces the main estimates. Column 2 adds county median household income, poverty rate, and unemployment rate. Column 3 restricts the sample to 2014–2019. Standard errors, clustered by shelter, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.